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Abstract
This dissertation studies different aspects of the interaction between developed and develop-
ing countries in global supply chains.
The first chapter studies the matching between importing and exporting firms in global
supply chains. I construct a novel dataset that links firm-level information of Indian
manufacturing exporters from the CMIE-Prowess database with firm-level information of
their US importers from the Longitudinal Business Database. The data highlights three key
facts that are consistent with the predictions of a theoretical model featuring sequential
production and costly search for high-capability suppliers. First, there is positive assortative
matching between US buyers and their Indian suppliers. Second, the strength of positive
matching increases with the proximity to final use of the product traded (downstreamness).
Finally, matching is stronger - and more sensitive to downstreamness – when the demand
elasticity faced by the US buyer is high.
The second chapter examines the effects of export factory work on young girls’ school
enrollment in the context of the garment industry in Cambodia, which employs primarily
young, unmarried women from rural areas. I show that the female siblings of female
garment workers who were induced to work in garment exporting sector by their proximity
to the factories are one standard deviation more likely to attend school relative to their male
siblings. The evidence is consistent with non-unitary household decision-making in which
factory work increases the bargaining power of older female siblings within the household.
The third chapter, written jointly with Nathan Nunn, investigates the impact of Fair Trade
certification on coffee producers in Costa Rica. We begin by examining a panel of all coffee
iii
producers between 1999 and 2010. We find that FT certification is associated with higher
export prices equal to approximately 5 cents per pound. Linking the mill-level information
on FT certification to individual-level survey data, we find that FT certification does increase
incomes, but only for skilled coffee growers and farm owners. There is no evidence that
unskilled workers, particularly seasonal coffee pickers, benefit from certification.
iv
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Chapter 1
Firm-to-Firm Matching Along the
Global Supply Chain
1.1 Introduction
Every year, US firms engage in import transactions with more than one million firms
from around the world. Together, these transactions span more than one and half million
pairs of buyer-supplier relationships. These numbers have grown sharply over the last 20
years. Falling trade costs and improved supply chain management technology have led US
firms to outsource parts of the production chain to developing countries. Firms in these
countries now perform tasks at many different stages along the global supply chain from
the production of basic inputs to complex assembly of parts and manufacturing of final
goods. Production fragmentation has contributed to a large increase in the share of US
imports from developing countries, from around 28 percent in 1990 to 56 percent in 2012.
As a result, the matching between US buyers and their suppliers in developing countries
has become an increasingly important activity for both sides. US buyers invest substantial
resources in supplier selection and monitoring to ensure suppliers meet their requirements.
Supplier failure can be very costly as shortages of parts cause production delays and
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quality defects can lead to recalls1. For developing country firms, relationships with buyers
in developed countries provide not only market access, but also constitute an important
channel to access new technologies, management practices and demand information (Egan
and Mody, 1992).
Although the matching between buyers and suppliers plays an important role in interna-
tional transactions, our understanding of this matching process remains limited. In large
part, this is because data that allows us to observe detailed information about firms on both
sides is not easily available. To shed light on this question, I construct a novel dataset, which
links firm-level information on Indian manufacturing exporters from the CMIE-Prowess
database with firm-level information on the US firms with whom they engage in trade.
To create these matches I use the US import customs transactions from the US Census
confidential Linked/Longitudinal Firm Trade Transaction Database (LFTTD). I investigate
whether high-performing (large) US firms match with high-performing (large) Indian firms
and whether that varies systematically with the position in the supply chain of the Indian
firm.
I illustrate the intuition underlying the matching between buyers and suppliers along
the production chain in a model of sequential production featuring complementarities.
The production of a final good entails the completion of a number of sequential stages.
A buying firm (buyer) is in charge of organizing the production of the final good along
the value chain. Each stage of production m is controlled by a single supplier who uses
the value of production up to stage m   1 as an input into stage m production process.
Buyers and suppliers are heterogeneous in their capability. The stage revenue function
features complementarities between the the capabilities of the buying firm and of the
supplier controlling the stage. At each stage, buyers optimally choose the investments in
search for high-capability suppliers to control the production process. A key feature of the
model is that the marginal contribution to revenue of the stage-m supplier is increasing
with the stage of production m. This implies that the marginal benefit of search for the
1See Beil (2010) for a comprehensive discussion of the process of supplier selection.
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high-capability supplier increases with the stage of production. The model delivers three
main predictions. The optimal amount of investment in supplier search, and hence the
strength of positive assortative matching between buyers and suppliers increases with (1)
the stage of production; (2) the elasticity of demand faced by the buyer; (3) the stage of
production relatively more when the buyer faces more elastic demand. The third prediction
implies that the investment in search for the high-capability suppliers is more sensitive to
the stage of production when the buyer is selling a less differentiated product.
I test the model predictions in the matched data. I use US and Indian firm size as the
empirical counterparts to the buyer and supplier capability in the model, and the Antràs
et al. (2012) product “downstreamness” measure to capture the position in the production
chain of the Indian supplier. I employ two empirical strategies. In the first empirical strategy,
I calculate the average size of US firms buying a given product from an Indian firm, and
examine how that average varies with Indian firm size. I find that the estimated elasticity of
average US firm size with respect to Indian firm size is positive and around 0.24. Consistent
with the first prediction of the model, I find that the magnitude of the elasticity increases
with the downstreamness of the product traded. When the product traded is close to
final consumption (as is the case for consumer products), the elasticity is around 0.5, so a
doubling of Indian firm size is associated with an increase in average buyer size of 50%. The
sorting on size of buyers and suppliers trading very upstream products is much weaker.
Here, the estimated elasticity of US buyer size with respect to Indian firm size is close to
zero. The relationships are robust to controlling for other product characteristics that are
correlated with upstreamness. The last two predictions of the model also find support in
the data. Using the Broda and Weinstein (2006) estimates of import demand elasticities to
obtain a measure for the demand elasticity faced by US firms, I find that the buyer-size
elasticity is on average larger, and increases more rapidly with the stage of production,
when Indian firms deal with US buyers selling less differentiated products.
In the second empirical strategy, I estimate a model of selection into a trading relationship
at the Indian firm, US firm, product level as a function of US and Indian firm size, while
3
controlling for other product and firm characteristics available from the matched data.
Consistent with the estimated buyer-size elasticities, I find that the probability of engaging
in trade with larger US buyers is increasing with the size of the Indian supplier, and that this
probability declines with the distance from final use of the product traded. The results are
again broadly consistent with the model’s predictions for the influence of demand elasticity.
In focusing on the complementarity between buyer and supplier capability in global
production networks this paper is related to the extensive literature emphasizing the
complementarity of inputs in production and its extensions to sequential production settings
(Sattinger (1975), Milgrom and Roberts (1990), Kremer (1993), Maggi and Grossman (2000),
Garicano (2000), Antràs et al. (2007), Verhoogen (2008), Kugler and Verhoogen (2012), Antràs
and Chor (2013), Costinot et al. (2013)). A common feature is that a supermodular production
function where the marginal product of one agent is increasing in the productivity of the
other agents leads to positive assortative matching in equilibrium. Agents with similar
productivity work together. When production is sequential, the equilibrium allocation
dictates that higher productivity agents control later stages of production. Mistakes at
the end of the production chain destroy higher-valued intermediate inputs than in earlier
stages (Sobel (1992), Kremer (1993)). In international trade, a growing literature has
studied the implications of complementarities and sequential production for the patterns of
specialization and trade flows between countries. Costinot et al. (2013) build a theoretical
model to show that when production is sequential and subject to mistakes, countries with
higher income per capita which have lower probability of mistakes at all stages of production
specialize in the later stages of production, and low-income countries specialize in the earlier
stages of production. Antràs and Chor (2013) build a theoretical model to study how the
sequentiality of production shapes the optimal ownership structure (integration versus
outsourcing) between final-good producers and their various suppliers along the value
chain. Their model derives predictions for how property rights should be allocated along
the production chain and emphasize a key role played by the elasticity of demand faced by
the final-goods producer for the optimal allocation.
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This paper is also directly related to the extensive theoretical and empirical literature
in international trade emphasizing firm heterogeneity in differentiated product markets2.
In particular, this paper is part of an emerging strand of the literature examining the
matching of importing and exporting firms and the implications of two-sided heterogeneity
in international trade. The existing studies use customs-level data in which buyers and
sellers can be identified in each transaction (Blum et al. (2009), Blum et al. (2012), Bernard
et al. (2013))3. Using variables constructed from customs data to measure firm size, these
studies find that small exporters trade with large importers, while large exporters are able
to reach both large and small importers.
This paper contributes to our understanding of firm matching in the global economy
in three main ways. First, because this paper matches customs-level data with firm-level
data on buyers and sellers, it is able to employ an actual measure of firm performance
for both sides of the transaction and not rely solely on customs-level variables to obtain
buyer and seller characteristics, such as number of partners and total value of trade. Second,
this paper documents firm matching patterns between Southern suppliers (Indian firms)
and their buyers in the North (US firms), and the existing literature has focused largely on
South-South or North-North trade. Finally, this paper explores how the sorting patters of
buyers and suppliers vary with product characteristics, and finds that there is substantial
heterogeneity. It is this last distinction that is the most important. Both the model and
empirical results here suggest that how buyers and suppliers match with each other are
far from uniform across the product space. At a minimum, this matching depends on the
2See Melitz and Redding (2014, Forthcoming) and Bernard et al. (2012) for a review of theoretical and
empirical contributions.
3Other recent papers exploring buyer-supplier relationships are Carballo et al. (2013) and Eaton et al. (2012).
Carballo et al. (2013) use customs data from Costa Rica, Ecuador and Uruguay to explore the export margins
of firms. Decomposing exports across different margins, they find that the buyer extensive margin is at least
as important as the firm and the product extensive margins for aggregate bilateral exports as well as the
firm’s product extensive margin for firms destination-specific exports. Eaton et al. (2012) consider exports
of Colombian firms to US importers, and use the confidential US customs data containing US imports from
Colombian exporters. They develop a model of search and learning in which sellers learn from a given match
about their productivity in a given market, and this knowledge affects their subsequent search behavior for new
buyers.
5
position of the product in the supply chain and the elasticities of demand faced by the
buying firm, even for a given country pair. A better understanding of how the costs and
benefits of establishing a buyer-supplier match vary across different types of products and
trade relationships is needed to be able to explain the assortative matching patterns between
firms in the global economy.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section describes the theoretical framework
used to derive empirical predictions regarding the matching of buyers and sellers along
the value chain. Section III describes the data sources and the construction of the matched
dataset of Indian suppliers and their US buyers. Section IV presents the empirical strategy
and establishes the main empirical results. Section V concludes.
1.2 A Model of Sequential Production
In this section, I provide a stylized theoretical framework to guide the subsequent empirical
analysis. I consider a sequential production process in which each stage of production is
controlled by a different supplier. A final-goods producer (buyer) with capability q is in
charge of organizing the production chain. In each stage, the buyer chooses the capability of
a supplier to occupy a given stage of production. One can interpret the supplier’s capability
as its ability to meet the buyer-specific requirements for price, quality and delivery. To
illustrate the trade-off faced by the buyer in choosing a supplier at different stages of
production, I introduce supplier search costs. More precisely, I assume that before trade
between the buyer and the supplier takes place, the buyer needs to invest resources in a
search and screening to identify whether suppliers have high-capability, and are able to
meet its requirements. Higher investments in screening decrease the likelihood that the
buyer engages in a relationship with a low-capability supplier. The main trade-off faced by
the buyer along the value chain is between investing more resources in supplier search and
increasing the revenue generated in a given stage.
I derive the argument in four stages. First, I derive the marginal contribution to final
revenue of a supplier at stage m. Second, I show that the marginal contribution of the
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supplier occupying the stage of production m increases with the stage of production, m.
Third, to illustrate the trade-off faced by final goods producers in choosing suppliers along
the value chain, I introduce search costs for high-quality suppliers. I show that the marginal
benefit of search is increasing with the stage of production, and is increasing relatively more
for products in which the final buyer faces a high elasticity of demand.
1.2.1 Sequential Production
Assume that the production of a final good entails the completion of number of production
stages, which are indexed by j. Each stage of production is controlled by a different supplier.
Production is sequential - stage j cannot commence until stage j  1 has been completed.
Let qj be the capability of a supplier controlling stage j. The volume of production up to
stage m is given by
q(m) = q
m
’
j=1
qj I(j) (1.1)
j is increasing with the stage of production. I(j) = 1 if supplier j enters the production
chain after stages j0 < j have been completed and 0 otherwise. A final-goods producer with
capability q is in charge of organizing the production chain. Note that it is necessary to
impose qj > 1 for the production to be increasing along the value chain.
The sequential nature of production implies that downstream suppliers are useless
unless upstream stages have been completed. In fact, it is useful to express the technology
in equation (1.1) in differential form. The marginal contribution to output of the supplier at
stage m is given by:
q(m)  q(m  1) = q
m
’
i=1
qi   q
m 1
’
i=1
qi = q(
m 1
’
i=1
qi)I(m)(qm   1) (1.2)
The supplier at stage m uses the value of production up to stage m, q(m  1) as an input
to the stage-m production process, where it combines this input with its own capability
qm. Note that the importance of supplier m’s capability to total output is increasing with
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the value of production accumulated up to stage m (q(m   1)), and hence the stage of
production.
1.2.2 Preferences
The final good is a differentiated variety in the eyes of the consumer and belongs to an
industry in which firms produce a continuum of goods. Consumer have preferences that
feature a constant elasticity of substitution across these varieties, equal to 1/(1  r) > 1
U = (
Z
w2W
q(w)rdw)
1
r
where r 2 (0, 1), q(w) is the quality-adjusted output of variety w and W is the set of varieties
consumed.
Under this class of preferences, consumer behavior can be modeled in terms of the
aggregate quantity of varieties consumed and an aggregate price. A firm producing variety
w will face a demand q(w) = Ap(w)
 1
1 r where A > 0 is the industry demand shifter, which
the firm treats as exogenous. The revenue function of the final goods producer of variety w
will be given by r(w) = A1 rqr.
Substituting the production technology defined in equation (1.1), the total revenue
generated by the buying firm up to stage m is given by:
r(m) = A1 rqrq(m)r (1.3)
The incremental contribution to final revenue of the stage-m supplier is given by
r(m)  r(m  1) = r0(m) = A1 rqrq(m)r   A1 rqrq(m  1)r = r(m  1)(qrm   1) (1.4)
Note that r0(m) is increasing with the stage of production because q(m  1) is increasing
along the production chain.
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1.2.3 Supplier Search
In each stage of production, the buyer must search for a supplier to perform the activities
required by the buyer in that given stage. For simplicity, assume that each stage of
production is populated by two types of suppliers: high-capability suppliers (qH) and
low-capability suppliers (qL). To identify the H types, a buyer needs to invest resources
in screening suppliers. Assume the screening costs are of the form c(p), where p is the
likelihood that the supplier is of type H. Assume that c(p) is convex in p, c0(p) > 0, c00(p) >
0.
The buyer and the supplier bargain over the surplus generated in a given stage of
production, and the buyer always obtains a share b of the stage surplus. The outside
option of the supplier is normalized to zero. Assume that the buyer searches sequentially
for suppliers along the value chain to maximize the marginal contribution to total revenue
of supplier m. This assumption holds if different divisions within the buying firm are
responsible for purchasing at different stages of production, and the division in charge of
stage m starts searching for stage-m suppliers after the searches in previous stages have
been completed. The buyer’s optimization problem is to choose the optimal amount of
investment in search to carry out at stage m, pm, to maximize expected stage profits:
maxpmb[pmr
0
H(m) + (1  pm)r0L(m)  c(pm) (1.5)
Substituting the expression for marginal contribution to revenue in equation (1.4), gives
maxpmb[pmr(m  1)(qrH   1) + (1  pm)r(m  1)(qrL   1)]  c(pm) (1.6)
At each stage, the buyer chooses the amount of investment in supplier search such that
the marginal cost of search equals the marginal benefit of search:
c0(pm) = bA1 rqrq(m  1)r[qrmH   qrmL] (1.7)
The marginal benefit of search is the difference in the stage revenues obtained with
9
the high-capability supplier and with the low capability supplier respectively. In the next
subsection, I will show that the marginal benefit of search increases with the stage of
production.
1.2.4 Empirical Predictions
First, note that the marginal benefit of search for high-capability suppliers is larger for
higher q buyers. High-capability suppliers are more valuable to high-q buyers because
the because the revenue function exhibits complementarities in the buyer and supplier
capability. This implies that higher-capability buyers will be more likely to engage in search
than lower capability buyers at all stages of production. This is the force that generates
positive assortative matching at all stages of the supply chain.
∂c0(p⇤m)
∂q
= rbA1 rqr 1q(m  1)r[qrmH   qrmL] > 0 (1.8)
The partial derivative of the optimal amount of search at stage m with respect to q is
also increasing with r, and hence 1/(1  r), the elasticity of demand faced by the buyer.
These two results imply high-capability buyers are more likely to work with high-capability
suppliers in products where the elasticity of demand faced by the buyer is high.
Second, note that the marginal benefit of search is increasing with the stage of production.
Differentiating equation 1.7 with respect to q(m  1), the value of production up to stage m
yields
∂c0(p⇤m)
∂q(m  1) = rbA
1 rqrq(m  1)r 1[qrmH   qrmL] > 0 (1.9)
The elasticity of final demand faced by the buyer also plays a role in shaping how the
investments in search change with the stage of production. Higher demand elasticities
magnify the investments in supplier search by final goods producers.
Summarizing, the model presented above delivers three main empirical predictions
regarding the likelihood that high-capability buyers engage in trade with high-capability
suppliers, as a function of the characteristics of the product traded and the nature of demand
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faced by the buyer.
Define positive assortative matching(PAM) as a high-capability (higher q) buyer engaging
in trade with the high-capability qH supplier. The likelihood that these two types of firms
match, which is a function of the marginal benefit of search, denotes the strength of PAM.
Equation 1.9 gives the following predictions:
1. The strength of PAM increases with the stage of production, m
2. The strength of PAM is increasing with the elasticity of demand faced by the buying
firm, r
3. The strength of PAM increases with the stage of production relatively more when
elasticity of demand faced by the buying firm is high
To test the model predictions, I use a novel matched dataset of relationships between
Indian manufacturing suppliers and US buyers which I describe in the next section. I
describe in detail how the model parameters are measured in the data.
1.3 Data and Matching
The challenge in observing the matching patterns predicted by the model is to link trade
transactions so that we can observe detailed characteristics of firms on both sides of the
transaction. The innovation of the dataset used this paper comes from the matching of a
sample of manufacturing exporting firms from the CMIE-Prowess database with US Census
Linked/Longitudinal Firm Trade Transaction Database (LFTTD)4. The matching allows us
for the first time to identify the characteristics of firms who engage in a trade transaction.
LFTTD is itself a matched dataset, and links the Foreign Trade Data (FTD) from the US
customs with the Longitudinal Business Database (LBD) (Bernard et al., 2010). The FTD
is assembled by the US Census Bureau and US Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and
captures all international trade transactions (imports and exports) carried out by US firms
4For detailed description see http://econ.duke.edu/tcrdc/census-data/mixed/lfttd-overview.
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from 1992 until present. For each import and export transaction, the dataset records the
product classification (at the HS 10-digit level), the value and quantity transacted, the date
of the shipment, the destination (or source) country, the transport mode, and whether the
transaction takes place at arm’s length or between related parties5.
The US Census Bureau’s Longitudinal Business Database (LBD)6 records annual em-
ployment, payroll, industry classification, and survival information for the universe of
establishments in the non-farm private sector with at least one paid employee starting in
1976. The unit of observation is an establishment which is defined as a single physical
location where economic activity takes place. Each establishment has a corresponding firm
identifier. US firms can own a single establishment or multiple establishments. Since the
FTD records the US firm (not the establishment) undertaking a foreign transaction, the links
between LBD and FTD are done at the firm level. This means that it is only possible to
assign foreign transactions to a US firm rather than a US establishment. On average 80% of
trade transactions by value can be matched with importer information in LBD (Bernard et
al., 2010).
I match the LFTTD with the CMIE-Prowess database of Indian firms. The CMIE-Prowess
database of Indian firms provides income/expenditure (including the amount of revenue
generated from exports) and balance sheet data for medium and large firms in India. The
companies account for close to 70 percent of the economic activity in the organized industrial
sector India and close to 60 percent of exports.
1.3.1 Matching LFTTD with Prowess
The matching between Prowess and LFTTD is possible because Prowess contains the name
and the address of Indian firms. While the LFTTD does not store the full name of exporting
5“Related-party”, or intra-firm, trade refers to shipments between US companies and their foreign sub-
sidiaries as well as trade between US subsidiaries of foreign companies and their affiliates abroad. For imports,
firms are “related” if either owns, controls or holds voting power equivalent to 6 percent of the outstanding
voting stock or shares of the other organization.
6See Jarmin and Miranda (2002) for detailed description.
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firms, it contains a variable called manufacturer’s ID (manufid) which contains parts of an
exporting firm name and address.The US Customs provides detailed instructions on how
to construct the manufid variable7. The LFTTD manufid variable has only recently been
used in academic research papers to identify buyer-supplier relationships (see Eaton et al.
(2012), Kamal and Krizan (2013), Kamal and Sundaram (2012)). I conduct the matching in
4 steps. First, I start with an initial sample of approximately 4,900 manufacturing firms
with positive exports in at least one year between 1995 and 2007, as reported in the Prowess
database. Second, I match the name part of the manufacturer’s ID in LFTTD with the names
of Prowess exporters. Third, I construct a location matching score for the manufacturer’s ID
based on an indicator variable which is equal to 1 if the city of the exporter as reported in
LFTTD corresponds to the set of cities reported in Prowess. Finally, I construct a product
matching score based on an indicator variable which checks whether the product shipped
by Indian firms is the same as the product recorded in the customs data. I drop all the
manufacturer’s ID assigned to an Indian firm with location and product matching scores of
less than 90%. I also drop from the matched data any Indian firms who have less than 5
transactions in total to eliminate accidental exporters from the database.
1.3.2 Summary of the Matched Data
The matched dataset spans around 128,400 trade transactions and 7,400 importer-exporter
relationships between 1995 and 2007. I collapse all the transactions between an Indian
exporter and a US importer at the year and product level (HS-4). The characteristics of the
US and Indian firms in a given year are derived from the LBD and Prowess respectively.
The number of Indian manufacturing firms in the matched sample is approximately
1050. This represents around 20% of the number of exporting firms from the initial sample
of Indian exporters8. Importantly, the dataset contains only those Indian manufacturing
7For example, a company with the name of Cosmo Garments with registered office address JLB Road 229,
Mysore, Karnataka state should appear in LFTTD as INCOSGAR22MYS in LFTTD.
8The match rate in terms of the number of firms is comparable to India’s aggregate trade with the US. The
US represents roughly 10% (13% excluding oil) of India’s exports to the world.
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Table 1.1: US Importing Firms: Summary Statistics
Whole-
sale Retail
Manufac-
turing
Mean 5,816              234,000,000$           12.9 129 30 0.5 0.1 0.3
St. Dev 35,033            1,540,000,000$        8.0 558 117 0.5 0.3 0.4
Share of Firm Employment
Notes: The table presents summary statistics for the US firms in the matched data. Total number of firms (rounded) is 4100. Mean of ln(employment) is  4.41 
and the standard deviation of ln total employment is 2.92.
Firm size (total 
employment
Value of  yearly 
imports 
Firm age 
(years)
 Number of 
products 
imported 
(HS-10)
Number of 
suppliers in 
a given 
product   
(HS-4)
firms which trade directly. Although firms might record positive exports in Prowess, they
may be exporting indirectly through Indian intermediary firms. These firms will not be part
of the matched dataset.
On the US side, the matched sample contains around 4,100 US importers. This represents
around 2 percent of the total number of importers which was estimated to be around 184,000
in 2011. Table 1.1 presents the summary statistics for the sample of US firms.
The distribution of activities of US firms in the sample is roughly similar to the patterns
documented in earlier studies by Bernard et al. (2009). Studying the differences between
intermediaries (categorized as wholesalers and retailers) and other types of firms, Bernard
et al. (2009) find that more than 42 percent of importing firms are “pure” wholesalers (firms
with 100% of employment in wholesaling), but they account for only 15 percent of import
value. “Pure” retailers (firms with 100% of employment in retailing) are less prevalent and
smaller than wholesalers and account for only 1% of import value. More than 50% of import
value is accounted for by “mixed” firms, firms with operations that span wholesale or retail
and other sectors. “Mixed” firms are very rare, accounting for only 5% of the number of
importers, but they are substantially larger, trade more products, trade with more countries,
and are more likely to engage in related-party trade. Under their classification, more than
half of the US firms in the dataset are “pure” wholesalers (2,200 or 53%), 4% are “pure”
retailers, 17% (700) are pure manufacturing firms and 17% (700) are mixed firms out of
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which 500 are firms with predominant manufacturing activities and the rest are firms with
predominant intermediation activities. I use the dummies for the firm types as controls
in the regression. As alternative controls to capture the types of activities of US firms, I
also construct measures of intensity of various types of activities, such as wholesale, retail
and manufacturing intensity. I do this by dividing employment in these activities by total
employment.
The average number of US buyers per firm is 3, and per firm-product is 1.4. The average
relationship duration is 2.8 years. The total number of products (at HS-4 level) in the sample
is approximately 700. The top products in the sample are apparel and textiles, chemicals
and foodstuffs and which are representative of Indian exports to the US.
1.3.3 Measuring Key Parameters of the Model
The predictions of the theoretical model center around three parameters: firm capability,
stage of production, and elasticity of demand faced by the buying firm. I now describe how
I proxy each of these variables empirically.
US and Indian Firm Capability
There are clearly many dimensions to the matching and selection process between buyers
and suppliers in the global production chain. The model of sequential production developed
in Section 2 focuses on the matching of buyers and suppliers on one key dimension: firm
capability. In the data, I proxy this with firm size, as measured from the Prowess for Indian
firms and LBD for US firms. I use total firm revenues to measure firm size in Indian and
total firm employment to measure firm size in the U.S. Firm size is positively correlated
with firm capability in heterogeneous firm trade (HFT) models in international trade (Melitz
(2003) and its numerous extensions). In these models, ex-ante homogeneous firms pay a
fixed cost to receive a "capability"9 draw, j, from an exogenous distribution. j uniquely
9In Melitz (2003) higher "capability" entails higher productivity, or lower marginal costs of production. In
the extensions to the Melitz model to include endogenous quality choice, higher capability is associated with
higher product quality and high prices
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determines pricing, revenues, and profits, generating ex-post firm heterogeneity. Under
both CES and linear demand and monopolistic competition, higher j firms will earn higher
revenues, make higher profits and hire more workers.
Using firm size (as opposed to calculated TFP) to proxy for firm capability abstracts from
some of the well-known difficulties of measuring TFP in the presence of quality heterogeneity
of inputs and outputs (see Loecker and Goldberg (2014) for extended discussion). Firm size
has the advantage of being easily measurable in the data for both US and Indian firms. I
use two different measures of size as the empirical measures of firm productivity dictated
by data availability in the two datasets: total firm revenues for Indian firms and firm total
employment for US firms. Both measures of firm size move in tandem with the theoretical
concept of productivity that underpins the HFT models, as dicussed above.
I follow Haltiwanger et al. (2013) and calculate US firm size as the sum of employment at
all establishments owned by the firm from LBD. The size of single-unit establishments will
be employment at the single establishment owned by the firm.
I also consider alternative measures of US firm size which have been used by existing
studies using customs data. I calculate the total value of imports as one alternative measure.
This is obtained by summing over all the import transactions assigned to a US firm in a given
year in the customs data. I calculate this measure both at the product level and at the firm
level. I also calculate the total number of suppliers at the firm-year and firm-product-year
level by counting the unique number of manufacturer’s IDs with whom the US firm trades.
Finally, I combine total firm employment calculated from LBD and the total value of imports
from LFTTD to construct a measure of import intensity, the value of imports per employee.
This variable allows us to quantify the degree to which firms are specialized importers and
distribute the products imported to other firms, or they are using the imports in production.
I measure Indian firm size with total revenues reported in the Prowess database. In the
sample of all exporters from Prowess, the mean firm size is 3855.77 Million Rupees (6.35 in
logs) while the median is 596.65 Million Rupees (6.35 in logs). The standard deviation is
40763.2 Million Rupees (1.7 in logs). In the matched sample, the mean firm size in logs is
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6.74 and the standard deviation is 1.6.
Stage of production, m
The model predicts that the strength of assortative matching increases with the stage
of production, m. To obtain a measure of the stage of production of the Indian firm, I
use the product upstreamness measure developed by Antràs et al. (2012). This measure
gives the average distance from final use of a given product and was constructed using
the information from 2002 Input-Output tables of the United States from the BEA. More
precisely, the upstreamness of a given industry is a weighted average of the distance from
final use at which the industry’s output is used, with the weight equal to the share of
industry’s use at each stage from total industry output. I use the BEA concordance between
2002 Input-Output commodity codes and the foreign trade harmonized codes.
Consider an economy with i. The value of gross output (Yi) equals the sum of its use as
a final good (Fi) and its use as an intermediate input to other industries (Zi)
Yi = Fi + Zi = Fi +
N
Â
j=1
dijYj
where dij is the dollar amount of sector i’s output needed to produce one dollar’s worth of
industry j’s output.Fi is composed of personal consumption and private fixed investment.
This identity can be iterated which results in industry i’s output being expressed as an
infinite sequence of terms which reflect the use of this industry’s output at different positions
in the value chain, starting with final use:
Yi = Fi + Zi = Fi +
N
Â
j=1
N
Â
k=1
dikdkjFj +
N
Â
j=1
N
Â
k=1
N
Â
l=1
dildlkdkjFj + ...
Antràs et al. (2012) suggest calculating an industry i’s upstreamness measure can be
obtained by dividing each of the terms in the expression above by the total output Yi and
weighing each term by the distance from final use plus 1
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Figure 1.1: The Upstreamness of US Manufacturing Industries: Least and Most Upstream Industries
!
Constructing Industry Upstreamness
Upstreamness in US Production
Table 1. Least and Most Upstream Industries (Manuf.)
US IO2002 Industry Upstreamness
Automobile (336111) 1.000
Light truck and utility vehicle (336112) 1.001
Nonupholstered wood household furniture (337112) 1.005
Upholstered household furniture (337121) 1.007
Footwear (316200) 1.007
Motor home (336213) 1.012
Truck trailer (336212) 1.017
Manufactured home (mobile home) (321991) 1.019
Women’s and girls’ cut and sew apparel (315230) 1.024
Mattress (337910) 1.029
Plastics material and resin (325211) 3.571
Copper rolling, drawing, extruding and alloying (331420) 3.611
Alkalies and chlorine (325181) 3.611
Carbon and graphite product (335991) 3.748
Fertilizer (325310) 3.762
Alumina refining and primary aluminum (33131A) 3.814
Other basic organic chemical (325190) 3.853
Secondary smelting and alloying of aluminum (331314) 4.064
Primary smelting and refining of copper (331411) 4.355
Petrochemical (325110) 4.651
ACFH (Harvard, SMU, Colorado & Melbourne) Measuring Upstreamness 8 Jan 2012 AEA meetings 11 / 19
Ui = 1 · FiYi + 2 ·
ÂNj=1 Fj
Yi
+ 3 · Â
N
j=1Â
N
k=1 dikdkjFj
Yi
+ 4 · Â
N
j=1Â
N
k=1Â
N
l=1 dildlkdkjFj
Yi
+ ...
The Ui measure ranges from 1, where all of the industry’s output is used in final
consumption, to 4.5 where all of an industry’s output is used as inputs for industries who
are on average 4 steps removed from final use, since those industries serve as inputs to
more downstream industries and so on. The mean of the upstreamness variable Ui is
2.09 and the standard deviation is 0.85. Figure 1.1 presents the industries with the lowest
and highest values of upstreamness respectively. Consumer products have low values of
upstreamness since their output is allocated to personal consumption expenditures while
chemicals, plastics and petrochemicals have very high values of upstreamness since all of
the output in these industries serves as intermediate inputs for other intermediate input
industries and so on.
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Buyer Demand Elasticity, 1/(1  r)
Testing the predictions of the model entails obtaining a measure of the elasticities of
demand faced by US buyers. I do this using the NAICS industry classification of the buyer
establishments available from LBD and the Broda-Weinstein import demand elasticities. I
use the concordance between the HS-10 product classification (at which level the Broda-
Weinstein elasticities are estimated) and the NAICS industry classifications from (Pierce and
Schott, 2012).
The concordance between NAICS industry codes and HS-10 codes is available only for
manufacturing industries. However, almost three quarters of the sample is comprised of
US buyers who are classified as wholesalers, retailers or mixed-intermediary firms. Unlike
manufacturing firms, these buyers will sell the same product in the US market as the product
traded with the Indian firm. For buyers who are intermediaries, I assume that the elasticity
of demand they face is equal to the Broda-Weinstein elasticity of the product they trade. For
buyers who are classified in manufacturing, the elasticity of demand is the average demand
elasticity of their NAICS industry which is obtained averaging the elasticities of the HS
codes corresponding to their NAICS concordance.
1.4 Empirical Strategy
1.4.1 Size Elasticities
I start by documenting average correlations between the Indian firm size and the average
size of the US firms with whom they engage in trade. To do this, I create a measure of
“exposure” to US firm characteristic c (such as total employment, total value of imports,
etc) for a given exporting firm i in product p in year t, Ecipt. The exposure to US firm
characteristic c is the weighted average of the characteristic c of importers m with whom
firm i trades in product p. More precisely:
Ecipt = Â
m2i
Ximpt
Xipt
cmt
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where m denotes as US importer, cmt denotes importer m’s characteristic of interest at time t
(such as total employment); Ximpt is the value of exports from exporter i to importer m in
product p in year t and Xipt denotes exporter i’s total value of exports of product p in year t.
The exposure measure takes into account both the intensive and extensive margins of Indian
firm’s trade with US firms. The characteristics of those buying firms who account for more
of exporter’s US revenues in product p receive a higher weight in the exposure measure
calculation. I also calculate an “extensive” measure of exposure to US firm characteristics
as the simple average of buyer characteristics. In that calculation, each buyer has the same
weight, irrespective of its trade with p at time t. The results presented in the next section
are robust to employing this alternative measure of exposure, and the magnitude of the
coefficients is similar.
Exporter i’s exposure to US firm size as measured by total employment (Empmt) will
be the weighted average of the average employment of US firms buying product p from
exporting firm i in year t. Because the exposure measure is calculated at the Indian firm,
product level, firms exporting multiple products may have different exposures to US firm
size for each product, if the set of buyers buying each product is different.
Eempipt = Â
m2i
Ximpt
Xipt
Empmt
Figure 1.2 presents the relationship between Indian firm size Sit (on the x-axis) and the
exposure to US firm employment in a given product, Eempipt , (on the y-axis) non-parametrically,
in a binned scatter plot. To construct the binned scatter plot, I first residualize Sit and E
emp
ipt
with respect to HS 4-digit product fixed effect using an OLS regression estimated on the
whole sample. I then divide the residuals of Sit into ten equally-sized bins and plot the
means of Eempipt residuals in each bin against the mean of Sit residuals. The relationship is
positive suggesting that larger Indian firms tend to engage in relationships with larger US
firms in the sample.
To explore how the relationship between Indian firm size and their exposure to US firm
size varies along the supply chain, I construct the binned scatter plot in two subsamples.
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Figure 1.2: The Relationship Between Indian Firm Size and the Average Size of Its US Buyers
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The first subsample is comprised of Indian firms who trade products in the bottom 25th
percentile of product upstreamness (close to final consumption), and the second subsample
is composed of firms trading products in the top 75th percentile of product upstreamness.
Figures 1.3 and 1.4 present the corresponding binned scatter plots for the two subsamples.
The plots suggest that the positive relationship between Indian firm size and average size of
US firms with whom they interact in a given product is driven by products who are close to
final use (essentially consumer products). This relationship is much weaker when Indian
firms export very upstream products, since large and small Indian firms tend to interact
with US firms of the same size on average.
Turning to regression analysis, the baseline estimation equation is the following
ln Ecipt = at + ap + b1ln Sit + # ipt (1.10)
where at are year fixed effects (1995-2007), ap are product (HS-4) fixed effects, Sit is the size
(total revenues) of Indian firm i in year t and Ecipt is firm i’s exposure to measures of US firm
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Figure 1.3: The Relationship Between Indian Firm Size and the Average Size of Its US Buyers – Downstream
Products
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Figure 1.4: The Relationship Between Indian Firm Size and the Average Size of Its US Buyers – Upstream
Products
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size in product p at time t. The product fixed effects ap control for systematic differences
across products in the size of exporters and their exposure to US firm characteristics trading
a given product. The year fixed effects control for shocks common to all Indian firms which
may affect their trade with US firms and their exposure to US firm characteristics.
The coefficient b1 measures the elasticity of average US buyer size with respect to Indian
firm size within a given product. That is, b1 measures the percentage change in the average
size of the US buyer corresponding to a 1% increase in Indian firm size. A positive and
significant b1 suggests that larger Indian exporters tend to trade with larger US importers.
To test the first prediction of the theoretical model and explore how the buyer size
elasticity varies with the stage of production of the Indian firm, I estimate the following
equation in which an interaction term of Indian firm size and the upstreamness measure is
added to the previous specification:
ln Ecipt = at + ap + b1ln Sit + b2ln Sit · Up + # ipt (1.11)
where Up is the Antras-Chor-Fally-Hillberry upstreamness measure described in the previ-
ous section. The direct impact of upstreamness Up is absorbed by the product fixed effect
ap. The coefficient b2 measures the change in the buyer-size elasticity as the distance from
final use of the product traded varies. The first empirical prediction of the model in section
2 suggests that b2 should be negative and significant. As the product traded is closer to
final consumption (Up is decreasing), the strength of assortative matching is stronger - the
average size of the buyers with whom an Indian supplier interacts is increasing with Indian
supplier size. The total elasticity of average buyer size with respect to Indian firm size for a
given product with upstreamness Up will be given by b1 + b2 · Up.
To test the second and third predictions of the theoretical model regarding the role the
elasticity of demand faced by the US firm, I estimate the following equation:
ln Ecipt = at + ap + b1ln Sit + b2ln Sit · Up + b3ln Sit · Bipt + b4ln Sit · Bipt · Up+
+b5Up · Bipt + b6Bipt + # ipt (1.12)
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where Bipt is the buyer demand elasticity faced by Indian exporter i in product p at time
t, and it is calculated as a weighted average of the the demand elasticities with whom
the Indian exporter interacts in product p at time t. Note that because the buyer demand
elasticity varies at the Indian firm-product level, is not absorbed by the product fixed effect.
The model predicts that b3 + b4 will be positive and significant. The strength of positive
assortative matching is stronger when the US buying firm faces a very elastic demand at
all stages of production. The third prediction of the theoretical mode is that b4 will be
negative and significant. The strength of assortative matching will increase faster with
downstreamness when the buyer sells a less differentiated product in the US market. In
the estimation, Bipt will be an indicator variable for whether the weighted average elasticity
calculated at the Indian firm i, product p, year t is above the median elasticity.
Estimation Results
Table 1.2 panel A presents the results from estimating equation (4.1). In column (1) the
dependent variable is the Indian exporter exposure to US firm size as measured by total
employment. The results in column (1) which are the linear regression counterpart of
the binned scatter plot in Figure 1.2, suggest that on average there is positive assortative
matching in the sample. A doubling of Indian supplier size is associated with close to 24%
increase in the average size of the buying firms with whom the supplier interacts. In column
(2) the dependent variable is the Indian exporter exposure to US firm size as measured by
the total value of imports. The results suggest that large Indian firms trade not only with
large US firms, but also with large US importers. However, the magnitude of the elasticity
is smaller. There is no association between Indian firm size and US buyer size as measured
by the number of foreign suppliers a firm has. Lastly, large Indian firms are also more likely
to be exposed to import-intensive US firms.
The results of estimating equation (1.11) are presented in table 1.2 panel B, and show
that there is substantial heterogeneity in the estimated elasticity with the distance to final
use of the product traded. The results confirm the first model prediction - the strength of
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positive assortative matching is increasing with the downstreamness of the product traded.
The coefficient b2 on the interaction of Indian firm size with the upstreamness measure
is negative and statistically significant for all exposure variables. Column (1) reports the
estimates of the elasticity of average US firm size as measured by employment with respect
to Indian firm size along the value chain. The elasticity declines as the product traded
is further away from final consumption suggesting the degree of assortative matching is
strongest for consumer products and much weaker for products which primarily serve as
intermediate inputs for other intermediate products. When the upstreamness measure is
equal to 1, which is the case for most consumer products, the magnitude of the elasticity
is firmly positive around 0.5. When upstreamness measure is approximately 3, the buyer
size elasticity becomes zero. This implies that there is no statistically significant difference
in the average size of buying firms for large and small Indian firms selling very upstream
products. The elasticity becomes negative for products with upstreamness above 3, but the
magnitude is very small.
Columns (2) and (3) show that the effect of upstreamness is robust to using other
measures for US firm size constructed from the customs data. Larger Indian firms are
likely to interact with larger importing firms, as measured by the value of total imports and
the number of foreign suppliers, when they export products close to final consumption,
but in very upstream product markets Indian firm size is not correlated with the average
size of the importing partner. These results support the model intuition that the benefit to
high-capability buyers of having high-capability suppliers is larger when suppliers enter
the production line in later stages, and as a result they engage more in search in these later
stages. The results in column (4) show that large Indian exporters increasingly engage in
trade with import-intensive US firms as the product they export is further away from final
use. When combined with the results in column (1), the results in column (4) suggest that
the trading partners of large exporters for upstream products are likely to be specialized
importers who trade very large volumes, but employ few employees in the US.
The results of testing the last two predictions of the model regarding the demand
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Table 1.2: Size Elasticities Along the Value Chain
!!Size!!(ln!
employment)!
!Import!Size!
(ln!Total!Value!
Imported)
Number!of!
Suppliers!(ln)
!Import!
Intensity!!
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Indian!Firm!Size!(ln!Sales) 0.234*** 0.129** 0.0459 0.100***
(0.086) (0.064) (0.045) (0.035)
Product!Fixed!Eﬀects!(HS4) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year!Fixed!Eﬀects! Yes Yes Yes Yes
RNsquared 0.252 0.316 0.328 0.239
Indian!Firm!Size!(ln!Sales) 0.708*** 0.253*** 0.245*** N0.0712
(0.174) (0.094) (0.073) (0.063)
Indian!Firm!Size!x!Upstreamness N0.220*** N0.0576* N0.0925*** 0.0797***
(0.062) (0.032) (0.025) (0.024)
Product!Fixed!Eﬀects!(HSN4) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year!Fixed!Eﬀects! Yes Yes Yes Yes
RNsquared 0.258 0.316 0.331 0.242
Exposure)to)US)Firm)Characteris4c
Panel&A
Panel&B
Notes: The unit of observaTon is an Indian ﬁrm i, exporTng product p at Tme t. The dependent
variables in columns (1) to (4) is the Indian ﬁrm exposure to a US ﬁrm characterisTc in product p in
year t. The exposure to a US ﬁrm characterisTc is calculated as the weighted average of the US ﬁrm
characterisTc with whom an Indian ﬁrm trades in product p at Tme t, with weights equal to the share
of exports to the US ﬁrm. In column (1), the dependent variable is the natural logarithm of exposure
to US ﬁrm employment. In column (2), the US ﬁrm characterisTc used is the total value of imports, in
column (3), the characterisTc used is the total number of suppliers, and in column (4), the
characterisTc used is the total value of imports divided by total employment. All regressions include
product ﬁxed eﬀects (at the HS 4Ndigit classiﬁcaTon) and year ﬁxed eﬀects. Product upstreamness
which measures the average distance from ﬁnal use of a given product. The upstreamness measure
varies!from!1!to!4.65.!!Standard!errors!in!parentheses!are!clustered!at!the!Indian!ﬁrm!level.!The!sample!
is composed of 1050 Indian ﬁrms, 700 products over 12 years (1995 to 2007). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
*p<0.1
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elasticity faced by the buyer are presented in Table 1.3, and are broadly in line with the
predictions of the model. The first two columns present the results of estimating 1.10 by
splitting the sample of Indian firms by the median elasticity, which is calculated at the
Indian firm, product, year level. The “high buyer-demand elasticity" subsample contains
those Indian firm-product-year observations for which the average buyer-demand elasticity
is above the median. The magnitude of the elasticity is 0.4 when Indian firms trade with
US firms facing a very elastic demand (on average) and 0.3 when they trade with US firms
selling a less elastic demand. This suggests that on average (at all stages of production)
larger Indian firms are more likely to trade with larger US firms when the US firms they
interact with face a very elastic demand. However, the differences in average elasticities
in the two subsamples are not statistically significant, as suggested by column (3) which
presents the results of estimating 1.10 and adding the interaction of Indian firm size with an
indicator variable for whether the average elasticity of the buyers to whom an Indian firm i
is selling product p is above the median. This interaction term is positive, but not statistically
significant, suggesting that on average the buyer-size demand elasticities for firms trading
with buyers facing high and low demand elasticities are equal, on average. Columns (4)
to (6) reveal that the buyer-size elasticities are higher for Indian firms trading with buyers
facing a very elastic demand only in later stages of production (product upstreamness is
above 2) offering partial support for the second empirical prediction of the theoretical model.
For very upstream products, the elasticity is negative for high buyer-demand elasticity and
close to zero for low buyer-demand elasticity. The third prediction of the model which states
that the buyer-size elasticity increases more rapidly with the stage of production when
buyers face a very elastic demand finds support in the data. In column (6), the coefficient
b4 from estimating equation 1.12 is negative and statistically significant. While the third
prediction of the theoretical model is not in line with the empirical results for the upper
range of the upstreamness variable, a potential problem is that the averaging of the buyer
elasticities at the Indian firm, product, year level will hide heterogeneity in the relationships
between buyers and suppliers and the elasticity of demand faced by the buyers. The second
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Table 1.3: Size Elasticities Along the Value Chain: The Role of Demand Elasticity
!High!Buyer!
Demand!
Elasi3city!
!Low!Buyer!
Demand!
Elasi3city! !Full!Sample!
!High!Buyer!
Demand!
Elasi3city!
!Low!Buyer!
Demand!
Elasi3city! Full!Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Indian!Firm!Size!(ln!Sales) 0.401*** 0.317*** 0.318*** 0.949*** 0.597*** 0.626***
(0.073) (0.070) (0.072) (0.169) (0.152) (0.152)
Indian!Firm!Size!x!High!Buyer!Demand!Elas3city!(=1) 0.048 0.302**
(0.062) (0.126)
Indian!Firm!Size!x!Upstreamness O0.264*** O0.127** O0.139**
(0.071) (0.058) (0.058)
Indian!Firm!Size!x!High!Buyer!Demand!Elas3city!(=1)! O0.128**
x!Upstreamness (0.057)
HSO4!Fixed!Eﬀect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year!Fixed!Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustering!Indian!Firm Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
ROsquared 0.358 0.345 0.297 0.354 0.362 0.304
Average'US'Firm'Size''(ln'employment)'
Notes: The unit of observa3on is an Indian ﬁrm i, expor3ng product p at 3me t. The dependent variable is the average US ﬁrm employment with whom an Indian
ﬁrm trades in product p at 3me t. All regressions include product ﬁxed eﬀects (deﬁned at the HS 4Odigit classiﬁca3on) and year ﬁxed eﬀects. Product upstreamness
measures the average distance from ﬁnal use of a given product. The upstreamness measure varies from 1 to 4.65. The buyer demand elas3city is calculated using
BrodaOWeinstein elas3ci3es of import demand and expressed at the HSO10 or NAICS 6Odigit level. The subsamples high/low buyer demand elas3ci3es are obtained
by spliang the sample by the median elasitcity calculated at the Indian ﬁrm, product, 3me level. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the Indian ﬁrm
level.!The!full!sample!is!composed!of!1050!Indian!ﬁrms,!700!products!over!12!years!(1995!to!2007).!***!p<0.01,!**!p<0.05,!!*p<0.1
empirical strategy presented in the next section will address this issue.
Alternative Hypotheses
There are a number of potential alternative explanations for the observed correlation
between the strength of the assortative matching patterns and product upstreamness.
Product upstreamness may be spuriously correlated with other product measures that are
relevant for the matching of buyers and suppliers in international trade. I derive these
hypotheses based on existing theories in international trade and the empirical correlations
of the upstreamness measure with other product characteristics presented in table 1.4.
The first alternative explanation for the observed patterns is that the matching process is
driven by product specificity, and not by the distance to final use of the product traded. In
particular, a concern here is that upstream products are more likely to be commodity-like
products which have a reference price or are sold on an organized exchange. When the
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Table 1.4: The Relationship Between Product Upstreamness and Other Product Characteristics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Rauch Measure
Broda-
Weinstein 
Elasticity
Price-Revenue 
Elasticity
Advertising 
Intensity R&D Intensity
Capital 
intensity
Ratio 
Sellers/Buyers 
(HS-10)
Price 
dispersion (HS-
10)
Upstreamness 0.256** -0.0681+ -0.127** -0.00633** 0.00438** 2.273** -0.414** 0.742**
(0.018) (0.040) (0.009) (0.000) (0.001) (0.120) (0.046) (0.070)
Constant -0.261** 1.974** 0.221** 0.0268** 0.00824** -0.776** 3.509** 0.152
(0.043) (0.096) (0.021) (0.001) (0.002) (0.293) (0.111) (0.169)
R-squared 0.232 0.004 0.243 0.245 0.035 0.339 0.106 0.14
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1
product traded is a commodity, a high-capability supplier may be easily substitutable with
a lower-capability supplier. I use the Rauch (1999) measure which classifies products based
on whether they are sold on an organized exchange, have a reference price or neither and
the Broda and Weinstein (2006) estimates of import demand elasticities for the product
traded to to test the robustness of my results to this alternative explanation. Table 1.5
presents the results from estimation equation (2) including controls for Indian firm size
interaction with the Rauch product measure (panel A) and the the Broda and Weinstein
(2006) import demand elasticity of the product trade (panel B). The results show that b2
remains significant and the magnitude remains almost unchanged. The matching process is
not seem to be driven by the correlation between upstreamness and product specificity.
The second alternative explanation is that the assortative matching between buyers
and suppliers is based on “quality” - buyers whose products have high-quality work with
suppliers who are able to deliver high-quality inputs - and upstreamness captures the scope
for quality differentiation of a given product. An extensive literature in international trade
has examined the implications of quality differentiation for firm’s pricing decisions and
export performance. To capture a product’s scope for quality differentiation, I employ
two measures which exhibit the highest correlation with upstreamness among the set of
measures previously used in the literature to capture scope for quality differentiation 10 the
10The results are robust for controlling for other “quality” measures such as R&D intensity and the length of
quality ladders measure developed by Khandelwal (2010).
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advertising intensity and the price elasticity of revenue of the product traded. Advertising
intensity is strongly negatively correlated with upstreamness, which is intuitive since the
industries that are most advertising intensive are closest to final consumers. The price
elasticity of revenue is a measure I construct from value and quantity data in the US import
customs transactions. In particular, within each HS 4-digit product in a given year, I regress
the log of unit values on the log of export revenues at the exporting firm level11. A positive
price elasticity of revenue suggests that exporting firms exporting those products earn
higher revenues by setting higher prices on average, consistent with an environment where
there is scope for quality differentiation. Products with a negative elasticity are likely to
exhibit low scope for quality differentiation since on average higher revenues are associated
with lower prices. The price elasticity of revenue measure is negatively correlated with
upstreamness suggesting that upstream products are more likely to be “cost” industries
with low scope for quality differentiation, while more downstream products have higher
scope for quality differentiation. Table 1.6 shows that the sorting of buyers and suppliers
along the production chain is robust to including interactions with the product measures
that captures the scope for quality differentiation. As previously, the coefficient b2 remains
significant and the magnitude remains roughly unchanged.
Finally, I control for two other product characteristics that are correlated with upstream-
ness, namely capital intensity of the product traded and the ratio of the number of sellers
to the number of buyers who are active trading a given product. Capital intensity exhibits
a highest correlation with product upstreamness, suggesting that consumer products are
on average more labor intensive than upstream products. The ratio of buyers and sellers
captures the (relative) market of thickness in a given product is negatively correlated with
upstreamness. Downstream products have more sellers per buyer on average relative to
upstream products. The results in table 1.7 show that the sorting patterns along the value
chain are also robust to controlling for these product characteristics.
11Manova and Zhang (2012) employ the same type of regression in exploring the export prices of Chinese
exporters.
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Table 1.5: Size Elasticities Along the Value Chain Controlling for Product Specificity
!!Size!!(ln!
employment)!
!Import!Size!
(ln!Total!Value!
Imported)
Number!of!
Suppliers!(ln)
!Import!
Intensity!!
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Indian!Firm!Size!(ln!Sales) 0.726*** 0.328*** 0.256*** F0.0985*
(0.167) (0.085) (0.068) (0.058)
Indian!Firm!Size!x!Upstreamness F0.235*** F0.118** F0.102*** 0.102***
(0.068) (0.047) (0.033) (0.028)
Indian!Firm!Size!x!Rauch!Measure 0.0554 0.224** 0.0334 F0.0808
(0.136) (0.113) (0.076) (0.071)
Product!Fixed!Eﬀects!(HSF4) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year!Fixed!Eﬀects! Yes Yes Yes Yes
RFsquared 0.258 0.318 0.331 0.242
Indian!Firm!Size!(ln!Sales) 0.475*** 0.0726 0.141* 0.0169
(0.164) (0.128) (0.082) (0.090)
Indian!Firm!Size!x!Upstreamness F0.213*** F0.0521* F0.0893*** 0.0770***
(0.060) (0.031) (0.024) (0.023)
Indian!Firm!Size!x!BrodaFWeinstein! 0.111** 0.0856** 0.0494** F0.0419
ElasVcity (0.049) (0.036) (0.023) (0.027)
Product!Fixed!Eﬀects!(HSF4) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year!Fixed!Eﬀects! Yes Yes Yes Yes
RFsquared 0.259 0.318 0.332 0.242
Exposure)to)US)Firm)Characteris4c
Panel&A
Notes: The unit of observaVon is an Indian ﬁrm i, exporVng product p at Vme t. The dependent variables in
columns (1) to (4) is the Indian ﬁrm exposure to a US ﬁrm characterisVc in product p in year t. The exposure to a
US ﬁrm characterisVc is calculated as the weighted average of the US ﬁrm characterisVc with whom an Indian ﬁrm
trades in product p at Vme t, with weights equal to the share of exports to the US ﬁrm. In column (1), the
dependent variable is the natural logarithm of exposure to US ﬁrm employment. In column (2), the US ﬁrm
characterisVc used is the total value of imports, in column (3), the characterisVc used is the total number of
suppliers, and in column (4), the characterisVc used is the total value of imports divided by total employment. All
regressions include product ﬁxed eﬀects (at the HS 4Fdigit classiﬁcaVon) and year ﬁxed eﬀects. Product
upstreamness which measures the average distance from ﬁnal use of a given product. The upstreamness measure
varies from 1 to 4.65. The Rauch Measure equals 1 if the product is sold in an organized exchange or has a
reference price. The BrodaFWeinstein elasVcity measures the median import demand elasVcity for the HS 4Fdigit
sector. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the Indian ﬁrm level. The sample is composed of 1050
Indian!ﬁrms,!700!products!over!12!years!(1995!to!2007).!***!p<0.01,!**!p<0.05,!!*p<0.1.
Panel&B
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Table 1.6: Size Elasticities Along the Value Chain Controlling for Product Scope for Quality Differentiation
!!Size!!(ln!
employment)!
!Import!Size!
(ln!Total!Value!
Imported)
Number!of!
Suppliers!(ln)
!Import!
Intensity!!
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Indian!Firm!Size!(ln!Sales) 0.795*** 0.221** 0.285*** F0.11
(0.217) (0.106) (0.084) (0.077)
Indian!Firm!Size!x!Upstreamness F0.238*** F0.0513 F0.101*** 0.0875***
(0.070) (0.035) (0.028) (0.025)
Indian!Firm!Size!x!AdverLsing! F3.533 1.264 F1.639 1.561
Intensity (3.594) (2.183) (1.778) (2.116)
Product!Fixed!Eﬀects!(HSF4) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year!Fixed!Eﬀects! Yes Yes Yes Yes
RFsquared 0.258 0.316 0.331 0.242
Indian!Firm!Size!(ln!Sales) 0.752*** 0.298*** 0.237*** F0.112*
(0.178) (0.093) (0.074) (0.064)
Indian!Firm!Size!x!Upstreamness F0.252*** F0.0902** F0.0872*** 0.109***
(0.069) (0.037) (0.029) (0.027)
Indian!Firm!Size!x!PriceFRevenue F0.314 F0.326** 0.0529 0.292**
ElasLcity (0.233) (0.154) (0.141) (0.118)
Product!Fixed!Eﬀects!(HSF4) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year!Fixed!Eﬀects! Yes Yes Yes Yes
RFsquared 0.258 0.317 0.331 0.243
Exposure)to)US)Firm)Characteris4c
Panel&A
Panel&B
Notes: The unit of observaLon is an Indian ﬁrm i, exporLng product p at Lme t. The dependent variables
in columns (1) to (4) is the Indian ﬁrm exposure to a US ﬁrm characterisLc in product p in year t. The
exposure to a US ﬁrm characterisLc is calculated as the weighted average of the US ﬁrm characterisLc
with whom an Indian ﬁrm trades in product p at Lme t, with weights equal to the share of exports to the
US ﬁrm. In column (1), the dependent variable is the natural logarithm of exposure to US ﬁrm
employment. In column (2), the US ﬁrm characterisLc used is the total value of imports, in column (3), the
characterisLc used is the total number of suppliers, and in column (4), the characterisLc used is the total
value of imports divided by total employment. All regressions include product ﬁxed eﬀects (at the HS 4F
digit classiﬁcaLon) and year ﬁxed eﬀects. Product upstreamness which measures the average distance
from ﬁnal use of a given product. The upstreamness measure varies from 1 to 4.65. AdverLsing intensity
measures the spending on adverLsiLng services as a share of total spending on inputs in a given industry.
The priceFrevenue elasLcity measures the average elasLcity of unit values with respect to revenues at the
HS 4Fdigit level in the US import data. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the Indian ﬁrm
level. The sample is composed of 1050 Indian ﬁrms, 700 products over 12 years (1995 to 2007).
***!p<0.01,!**!p<0.05,!!*p<0.1.
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Table 1.7: Size Elasticities Along the Value Chain Controlling for Product Capital Intensity and Market
Thickness
!!Size!!(ln!
employment)!
!Import!Size!
(ln!Total!Value!
Imported)
Number!of!
Suppliers!(ln)
!Import!
Intensity!!
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Indian!Firm!Size!(ln!Sales) 0.704*** 0.250*** 0.244*** D0.07
(0.175) (0.096) (0.074) (0.064)
Indian!Firm!Size!x!Upstreamness D0.279*** D0.101** D0.101*** 0.0975***
(0.074) (0.046) (0.034) (0.035)
Indian!Firm!Size!x!Capital!Intensity 0.115 0.0842 0.016!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 0.0163
(0.099) (0.068) (0.052) (0.052)
Product!Fixed!Eﬀects!(HSD4) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year!Fixed!Eﬀects! Yes Yes Yes Yes
RDsquared 0.259 0.317 0.331 0.242
Indian!Firm!Size!(ln!Sales) 0.579*** 0.240* 0.124 D0.03
(0.168) (0.127) (0.086) (0.096)
Indian!Firm!Size!x!Upstreamness D0.204*** D0.0560* D0.0771*** 0.0745***
(0.057) (0.030) (0.023) (0.025)
Indian!Firm!Size!x!RaSo!Sellers/Buyers 0.0282 0.00272 0.0265 D0.00905
(0.036) (0.024) (0.019) (0.016)
Product!Fixed!Eﬀects!(HSD4) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year!Fixed!Eﬀects! Yes Yes Yes Yes
RDsquared 0.258 0.316 0.331 0.242
Exposure)to)US)Firm)Characteris4c
Panel&A
Panel&B
Notes:!The!unit!of!observaSon!is!an!Indian!ﬁrm&i,!exporSng!product&p!at!Sme&t.!The!dependent!variables!in!columns!(1)!
to (4) is the Indian ﬁrm exposure to a US ﬁrm characterisSc in product p in year t. The exposure to a US ﬁrm
characterisSc is calculated as the weighted average of the US ﬁrm characterisSc with whom an Indian ﬁrm trades in
product p at Sme t, with weights equal to the share of exports to the US ﬁrm. In column (1), the dependent variable is
the natural logarithm of exposure to US ﬁrm employment. In column (2), the US ﬁrm characterisSc used is the total
value of imports, in column (3), the characterisSc used is the total number of suppliers, and in column (4), the
characterisSc used is the total value of imports divided by total employment. All regressions include product ﬁxed
eﬀects (at the HS 4Ddigit classiﬁcaSon) and year ﬁxed eﬀects. Product upstreamness which measures the average
distance from ﬁnal use of a given HS 4Ddigit product. The upstreamness measure varies from 1 to 4.65. The capital
intensity!measures!the!raSo!of!total!capital!stock!to!employment!at!the!HS!4Ddigit!level!.!The!raSo!of!buyers!to!sellers!is!
measured using the number of exporters to the US and the number of US ﬁrms acSve trading a given HS 4Ddigit
product in the US import data. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the Indian ﬁrm level. The sample is
composed!of!1050!Indian!ﬁrms,!700!products!over!12!years!(1995!to!2007).!***!p<0.01,!**!p<0.05,!!*p<0.1.
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1.4.2 Estimating the Probability of Positive Trade Between Firms
While the buyer size elasticities are informative for the underlying correlations in the data, a
shortcoming of this empirical strategy is that it does not allow us to fully take advantage of
the information on heterogeneity in relationships between Indian and US firms. Moreover,
the OLS regressions described in the previous section do not allows us to control easily
for other US firm characteristics that may be correlated with US firm size and may be the
driver of matching, such as US firm age and types of activity. Existing studies documenting
the heterogeneity of US importers using the LFTTD database have emphasized the type
and number of economic activities firms performed by US firms as an important source of
heterogeneity (Bernard et al., 2010). To the extent that firm activities are correlated with US
firm size, and the true matching process with Indian firms is based on firm activity rather
than firm size, the positive relationship between the likelihood of observing trade between
the US and Indian firm size will be spurious.
I employ an alternative empirical strategy to establish assortative matching between
Indian suppliers and US buyers, which allows me to address these concerns. I estimate a
linear probability model of the probability that a US importer and an Indian exporter engage
in a trading relationship as a function of importer and exporter size. The specification of
this equation is tightly related to the theoretical model in that trade between exporter i and
importer m is greater than zero if the benefits of establishing the match at stage i, r0(i) are
greater than the matching costs c(p).
To be able to estimate the model, the original dataset needs to be modified to account
for those relationships between buyers and suppliers in the sample that were not realized,
i.e trade “zeros”. To create the trade “zeros” within a given product, I construct the set
of importers M who are active in buying product p (at the HS 4-digit level) in year t in
the matched sample. The set M is restricted to include the US importers in the matched
sample12. This entails creating all possible matches between importers and exporters
12Note that set M can be defined as all the importers buying product p from India at time t. This would
include the set of importers in the matched sample and the importers who are buying product p from Indian
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The initial matched sample of Indian and US firms contains all the observations with
positive trade between US firms and their Indian suppliers. In each product p at year t,
I create an indicator variable Iimpt which is equal to 1 if a trading relationship between
exporter i and importer m exists in the matched dataset, and zero if the trading relationship
does not exist. The unit of observation is an Indian supplier (i), US buying firm (m), product
p, in year t.
The estimation equation is given by
Iimpt = lp + lt + b1ln Sit + b2ln Empmt + b3ln Sit · ln Empmt + XmtG+ # impt (1.13)
Iimpt is the indicator which equals 1 if a trading relationship exists between exporter i and
importer m in product p in year t in the matched sample. lp are product (HS 4-digit) fixed
effects and lt are year (1995-2007) fixed effects. Sit is the size (total revenues) of the exporter
i at time t and Empmt is the size of the importer m (total employment) active in trading
product p at time t.Xmt is a vector of time varying importer characteristics, such as age and
type of activity and their interactions with Indian firm size.
In this equation, the likelihood of observing trade between an exporter i and an importer
m in a given product p at time t is explained by the coefficient b3 on the interaction term
between Indian firm size and US firm size. A positive and significant b3 implies there will
be positive assortative matching of size between US firms and their Indian suppliers. The
interaction term between US firm size and Indian firm size is intuitive in the light of a
super-modular production function in which the cross-partial derivative of the joint payoff
function with respect to the performance of the buyer and the supplier is positive.
To test the first prediction of the theoretical model regarding the strength of assortative
matching along the value chain, I estimate the following equation:
firms that are not in the original sample
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Iimpt = lp + lt + b1ln Sizeit + b2ln Empmt + b3ln Sit · ln Empmt+
+b4ln Sit · ln Empmt · Up + b5ln Sit · Up + b6ln Empmt · Up + XmtQ+ # impt (1.14)
As in the previous empirical specification, Up is the product upstreamness measure
developed by Antràs et al. (2012). The vector Xmt contains US firm characteristics such as
age and type of activity and their interactions double and triple interactions with Indian firm
size and product upstreamness. The coefficient b4 captures the effect of varying product
upstreamness on the likelihood that larger Indian firms engage in trade with larger US firms.
The first prediction of the model implies that b4 should be negative and significant. The
likelihood that larger Indian firms trade with larger US firms declines as the product traded
is further away from final consumption, or, in the terminology of the model, increases as
proximity to final consumption increases.
Testing the second and third predictions of the model regarding the demand elasticity
faced by the US buying firms entails modifying the empirical specification in (1.14) by
adding the demand elasticity faced by US firm which is calculated at the NAICS 6-digit
level. The estimating equation is given by:
Iimpjt = lp + lj + lt + b1ln Sizeit + b2ln Empmt + b3ln Sit · ln Empmt + b4ln Sit · ln Empmt · Up+
+b5ln Sit · ln Empmt · Bj + b6ln Sit · ln Empmt · Bj · Up + XmtQ+ XitG+ # impjt
(1.15)
Iimpjt is an indicator variable which equals 1 if positive trade exists in in product p at time
t between Indian firm i and US importing firm m with industry classification j. lp is a
product traded fixed effect (HS-4), lj is the buyer’s industry fixed effect (NAICS 6-digit).Bj
is an indicator for whether the elasticity of demand faced by the US importing firm is above
the median elasticity in the sample. Xmt and Xit are vectors of time-varying importer and
exporter characteristics and their interactions with product and industry characteristics.
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The second prediction of the model suggests that b5 + b6 is positive and significant. This
means that the likelihood that larger Indian firms trade with larger US firms is higher if the
US buyer faces a very elastic demand, at all stages of production. The third prediction of the
model regarding the interaction of product upstreamness and the buyer demand elasticity
is that as we move down the production chain towards final consumption the probability
that larger Indian firms trade with larger US firms increases more rapidly with the elasticity
of demand faced by the US buyer. This implies that b6 is negative and significant.
Estimation Results
The results of estimating equation (1.13) are presented in Table 1.8 in columns (1) to (4).
Columns (1) and (2) do not contain any controls for US and Indian firm characteristics. In
Column (1) we control for product fixed effects at the HS 4-digit level, while in columns (2)
-(4) the fixed effects are at the US importer industry (NAICS 6-digit), product (HS 4-digit),
Indian industry (ISIC 2-digit). In column (3), I control for US and Indian firm age and their
interactions with Indian and US firm size respectively, as well as their interaction. I column
(4), I include controls for the types of activity US firms engage in and their interactions with
Indian firm size. Specifically, I control for manufacturing, retail, wholesale intensity, and
headquarter intensity of US firms.
The results show that the coefficient on the interaction term between Indian and US firm
size in equation (4.4) is positive and significant, consistent with positive assortative matching
on firm size between Indian and US firms. These results are robust to using US and Indian
firm industry fixed effects, controlling for firm age, and the types of activities carried out by
US firms. Note that the magnitude of the interaction term (shown in column (3)) declines
when controls for the types of activity of US firms and their interactions with Indian firm
size are included in the regression. The interaction terms (not presented in this table) show
that this is due to the inclusion of headquarter and retail intensity variables (the share
of US firm employment engaged in management and administration activities, and retail
activities respectively) which are positively correlated with US firm size. The headquarter
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and retail intensity interactions with Indian firm size are positive and significant. To the
extent that headquarter intensity also proxies for US firm capability, these results support
the predictions of the model. The results for the buyer retail intensity are also in line with
the intuition of the model - the marginal benefit of search for high-capability suppliers is
higher when buyers and supplier meet in later stages of production, where buyers are more
likely to be engaged in retail.
In terms of magnitude, the estimated coefficient in column (2) suggests that a one
standard deviation joint increase in logarithm of Indian firm size (1.6) and US firm size (2.92)
increases the likelihood of observing trade between the firms by 0.015, which is 5 percent of
the mean probability of trading. Indian firms whose size is one standard deviation above
the mean are 20 percent more likely to engage in trade with US firms whose size is one
standard deviation above the mean relative to US firms with one standard deviation below
the mean.
Columns (5) to (8) of Table 1.8 present the results from estimating equation (1.14) in
which the size interaction term and added controls are further interacted with product
upstreamness. In all specifications, the coefficient b4 is negative, supporting the first
prediction of the theoretical model, namely that the strength of positive assortative matching
is increasing with the stage of production. The estimated effect of the firm size interaction
term and its triple interaction with product upstreamness continues to be significant and
remains approximately the same in magnitude when US firm covariates are added to the
regression. Note the magnitude of the b3 + b4 coefficient on the firm size interaction term
varies from approximately 0.005 when the product traded is close to final consumption
(the value of product upstreamness is 1) to 0 for products with upstreamness around
3. The upstreamness cut-off when the sign of assortative matching becomes negative is
approximately equal to the cut-off obtained using the previous empirical specification. The
triple interaction term is negative for very upstream products, suggesting that larger Indian
firms are more likely to trade with smaller US firms in that region of the product space. In
terms of magnitude, a one standard deviation joint increase in logarithm of Indian firm size
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(1.6) and US firm size (2.92) increases the likelihood of observing trade between the firms by
0.047 (18 percent of the mean probability of observing positive trade in the sample), when
Indian firms export consumer products to US firms. Similarly, Indian firms whose size is
one standard deviation above the mean are 50 percent more likely to engage in trade with
US firms whose size is one standard deviation above the mean relative to US firms with
one standard deviation below the mean. The likelihood of engaging in trade with large US
firms does not vary with Indian firm size when the parties trade very upstream product.
To test the last two predictions of the model regarding the strength of assortative
matching and the elasticity of demand faced by the US firms, I first split the sample by
the median buyer demand elasticity and re-estimate equations (1.13) and (1.14) in the
two subsamples. I then estimate equation (1.15) using the full sample. The results from
estimation equations (1.13) and (1.14) are presented in panels B and C of Table 1.8. Columns
(1) to (4) in panels B and C show the magnitude of the coefficient b3 on the Indian and US
firm size interaction is almost three times as large when the sample is restricted to US firms
facing an elasticity of demand above median. These results support the third prediction of
the theoretical model which states that the likelihood of larger Indian firms engaging in trade
with larger US firms is higher when the US buyer faces a very elastic demand. The revenue
generated at a given stage of production is more sensitive to supplier’s capability, and as
a result the high-capability buyers are more likely to engage in search for high-capability
suppliers, generating stronger positive assortative matching. Columns (5) to (8) present
the results of estimating equation (1.14) in the two subsamples. The coefficient b4 on the
triple interaction term of US and Indian firm size and product upstreamness is larger in
magnitude and only statistically significant when the sample is restricted to those buyers
facing high elasticity of demand. These results are consistent with the fourth prediction of
the theoretical model which states that the elasticity of demand faced by the buyer magnifies
the impact of downstreamness on the investments in supplier search and implies that the
strength of assortative matching increases faster with the stage of production when the
buyer faces a very elastic demand.
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Table 1.9 summarizes the results obtained from splitting the sample by the median buyer
demand elasticity as well as presents the results from estimating equation (1.15) in column
(6). The results in column (3) suggests that the magnitude of the size interaction coefficients
obtained from the two subsamples are statistically different. The magnitude of the size
interaction term is almost three times as large when US buyers operate in industries where
the elasticity of demand is high. The results in column (6) broadly support the predictions
of the model. In particular b6 is negative and significant suggesting that the likelihood
of larger buyers and suppliers engaging in trade increases more rapidly with the stage
of production when the elasticity of demand faced by US buyers is high. When Indian
firms export consumer products (the product upstreamness measure has a value of 1), the
coefficients on the size interaction term are 0.006 and 0.002 for high and low buyer demand
elasticities, respectively. The magnitude of the size interaction coefficient becomes zero for
both high and low demand elasticity when the product traded has upstreamness around 3,
and becomes negative for upstreamness values above 3. For these products, the magnitude
of the size interaction coefficient is higher (less negative) when the US buyer faces a less
elastic demand. However, the difference in the magnitudes of these elasticities is small.
In sum, the results in tables 1.8 and 1.9 are broadly consistent with the prediction of the
theoretical model regarding the strength of the assortative matching between buyers and
suppliers, and the elasticity of demand faced by the buyer. Because buyer revenues are more
sensitive to supplier’s capability when the product variety sold by the US buyer in the final
goods market has close substitutes, high-capability buyers will find it optimal to invest more
resources in search for the high-capability suppliers, leading to stronger positive assortative
matching.
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1.5 Conclusion
Relationships between importing and exporting firms in global supply chains shape the in-
terdependence of countries, but our understanding of how these firms match in international
trade remains limited. Using a novel dataset that matches firm-level information on US
importing firms with firm-level information on their Indian exporters, this paper explored
theoretically and empirically the matching of trading firms at different stages in the global
production chain. A theoretical model of sequential production featuring complementarities
between the capability of buyers (US importers) and suppliers (Indian exporters) delivers
three predictions regarding the strength of positive assortative matching along the value
chain and the elasticity of final demand faced by the US importers. The model highlights
that the incentives of high-capability buyers to invest in search for high-capability suppliers
- and hence the strength of the positive assortative matching - are increasing with the stage
of production, with the elasticity of demand faced by the buyer, and with the interaction
of the stage of production and elasticity of demand. The model predictions find support
in the matched data, and are robust to using different empirical strategies, and controlling
for other product and firm characteristics. In particular, the results show that large Indian
exporters are more likely to engage in trade with large US firms when the product traded is
close to final use, as it is the case for consumer products. The positive matching patterns on
firm size are also stronger when the US firms sells a less differentiated product in the US
market, at all stages of the value chain. Finally, the strength of positive assortative matching
also increases more rapidly with the stage of production when the US buyer faces a very
elastic demand.
The results in this paper highlight the significant product and industry heterogeneity of
sorting patterns between importing and exporting firms in the global economy, even within
the same country pair. This suggests that average estimates of the strength of assortative
matching in a pooled sample are likely to mask significant heterogeneity. The theoretical
framework outlined in this paper highlights the trade-off between the marginal benefits
of a superior match with a supplier and the frictions involved in generating that match.
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Understanding more about the nature and magnitude of the costs of matching between
firms and how they vary with importing firm and product characteristics is necessary to our
understanding of trade costs. With the significant decline in tariffs and transportation costs
over the last decades, the costs of establishing a match between importing and exporting
firms might constitute the larger barrier to trade in today’s global economy.
A next step in this research agenda is to explore the role of US importer heterogeneity
for the productivity dynamics of Indian firms. An extensive literature in international trade
has studied how exporting affects firm productivity, often using as motivation case study
evidence on learning and technology transfer from developed country firms. The benefit of
the matched dataset is that it allows us to disaggregate the firm export status to account
for the heterogeneity of importers with whom exporters come into contact. The evidence
presented in this paper has revealed that the matching patterns differ substantially across
the value chain, and it may be fruitful to explore how firm productivity dynamics vary with
buyer characteristics depending on the production line position of exporting firms. Neither
the buyer heterogeneity that the matched data provides nor the importance of the position in
the value chain of exporters have been explored by previous learning-by-exporting studies.
In its focus on firm-heterogeneity on both sides of the trade transaction, this paper
contributes to the existing research agenda in international trade emphasizing the impor-
tance of firm heterogeneity for understanding trade patterns and the aggregate response of
economies to trade policy shocks. That research has uncovered substantial heterogeneity
in firm-level outcomes that vary with a firm’s participation in international trade. Only a
small fraction of firms engage in international trade, and those firms who do are larger and
more productive than purely domestic firms. Within the group of trading firms, a small
number of large firms account for most of trading activity in a given country. The research
in this paper suggests that trade activity between countries may be very concentrated in a
small number of (large) firm pairs when the product traded is close to final use. In future
research, I will examine how these observed sorting patterns at the product level vary with
the income-level exporting countries, and incorporate these features into the theoretical
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model. An understanding of how economies are linked through firm-to-firm relationships,
might shed light on the transmission of shocks across countries, especially when explored
through the lens of the “granularity” hypothesis in macroeconomics which emphasizes the
importance of idiosyncratic shocks to (large) firms in generating aggregate fluctuations.
In that respect, the evidence presented in this paper on the heterogeneity in the matching
of international buyers and suppliers - and the new matched data that allow us to observe
this - may be an initial step towards understanding how that same firm-to-firm heterogeneity
is relevant for understanding a broader range of economic phenomena.
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Chapter 2
The Gender Effects of Exporting:
Female Factory Work and Siblings’
Education in Cambodia
2.1 Introduction
The shift in the geographic location of production from the developed to the developing
world over the past decades has led to increased female labor force participation and the
“feminization” of manufacturing employment in the developing world (World Bank, 2012).
The expansion of low-skilled manufacturing exports (particularly apparel) has offered
significant employment opportunities for young, unmarried women especially in Central
America and Asia. This phenomenon has often been motivated with the preference for
female workers in export factories due women’s lower propensity to unionize, greater
agility and tolerance for repetitive tasks, as well as lower wages relative to men (Standing
(1999), Fontana (2009)). An extensive literature in economics has established that improving
women’s employment and income opportunities changes their bargaining power within the
household and affects household decision-making (Strauss and Thomas (1995). Behrman
(1997), Duflo (2003), Qian (2008)). While the extensive employment of women in export
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factories has received significant attention in the public domain, there has been little rigorous
evaluation of the effects of this type of work on household outcomes. This paper estimates
the impact of female export factory work on the school enrollment of siblings in the context
of Cambodia. The focus on education as an outcome variable is motivated by extensive
case study evidence which suggests that the education of younger sisters is an important
recipient of the wages earned by older sisters working in apparel export factories1.
As a result of increased market access to the United States, Cambodia has witnessed a
remarkable growth in its apparel exports, from 4 million in 1996 to close to 4 billion in 2013.
Apparel is by far the most important export industry in Cambodia, accounting for more
than 80 percent of its exports. The expansion of the apparel industry resulted in a significant
rise in job opportunities for women. Employment in export garment factories grew from
19,000 workers in 1996 to close to half a million in 2013 (Garment Manufacturers Association
in Cambodia, 2013). More than 80 percent of workers are young women who migrate from
rural areas to Phnom Penh, where the garment export cluster is located. The majority of
female factory workers have never been married and still reside in their parents’ households.
In most cases, their wages represent the main source of income for their families. In 2006,
the World Bank estimated that approximately 1.7 million people in Cambodia depend on
the industry directly or indirectly (World Bank, 2006).
The main challenge in identifying the causal effect of female export factory work on
the investments in education of siblings is selection bias – households who decide to send
a daughter to work in the factory may be different from households who do not in ways
that are unobserved to the econometrician and correlated with gender education decisions.
To address the selection bias I use a household’s proximity to garment factories as an
instrument for its propensity to send a female migrant to work in the factory. I apply this
instrument within the sample of households with at least one female member at “eligible”
age to obtain a job in the factory, which is considered to be between 15 and 302. The data
1See James (2014), Levi Strauss Foundation (2013), World Bank (2006)
2It has been argued that the preference for young women in export factories relates to their capacity to bear
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used in the analysis comes from the 2004 round of Cambodia’s Socio-Economic Household
Survey. I focus on the sample of children below 15 years old, which is the minimum age of
obtaining employment in the factory. The 2SLS estimates suggest that households who were
induced to send a migrant daughter to work in the export factory are 40 percentage points
more likely to be enrolled in school relative to their male siblings. The effects are larger and
statistically significant only for the older cohort of siblings with ages between 10 and 15.
We find that proximity to the factories does not affect young girls’ relative propensity to
attend school in households with no female household member at “eligible” age to obtain a
job in the factory, in neither the 5-9 and 10-15 age cohorts. This provides support for the
exogeneity assumption underlying the validity of the distance instrument.
The identification assumption underlying this estimation strategy is that any within-
household differences in school enrollment of female siblings relative to their male siblings,
between the households who reside in districts close to Phnom Penh relative to households
in more distant districts, would have been the same in the absence of the expansion of the
garment sector. To support this assumption, I show that the proximity to Phnom Penh is not
associated with intra-household differences in young girls’ relative propensity to enroll in
school 1996, the year prior to Cambodia’s normalization of trade relations with the United
States, which was the catalyst of the garment export expansion.
The results are consistent with two channels, which are challenging to disentangle in
the current setting. By increasing female-specific income garment jobs may increase older
daughter’s bargaining power within the household. If older female siblings have a higher
preference for investing in their sisters relative to their older brothers, then this would
lead to an increase the investment in education for girls. The second channel is that a
member working in a job in an export factory raises total household income and this should
increase investments in education for girls, if girls education is a luxury good relative to
boys’ education. The absence of any statistically significant reduced form effects of distance
children. Employers do not expect women to continue working in the factory once they establish their own
families (Elson and Pearson, 1981).
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on the propensity to attend schools in households with no “eligible” female member rules
out two other explanations which are consistent with the results; that garments jobs may
alter the relative return of investing girls’ education and that women factory workers may
act as role models for younger women and change their beliefs and aspirations, which in
turn may affect their propensity to attend school.
I present suggestive evidence supportive of the first channel. The proximity to Phnom
Penh is not associated with a higher propensity of female siblings to be enrolled in school
relative to their male siblings in households with an older brother of eligible age to work in
the factory, but with no daughter of eligible age. In addition, a simple test of girls’ education
being a luxury good for Cambodian households does not find support for this hypotheses.
In the sample of households with no member employed in apparel, girls are not more
likely to be enrolled in school relative to their brothers in richer households. However,
in the absence of a shock of equal magnitude to male-specific income, these tests cannot
completely rule out the income effect channel.
The quantitative results presented in this paper are consistent with qualitative evidence
which suggests that garment workers direct some of their earnings towards the education
of younger sisters. The extra income helps their sisters them stay in school in order
to obtain higher-paying jobs outside the garment sector3. A descriptive analysis of the
wage data suggests that the returns to schooling in the garment industry are non-existent,
while they are positive in other paid jobs. Garment wages are on average twice as large
relative to wages in the rest of the economy, but female wages in other sectors of the
economy,such as education and other professional jobs, are higher than garment sector wages
upon the completion of a high-school diploma. Moreover, garment jobs may incorporate
compensating differentials for the occupational hazards and negative health impacts which
may be associated with working in an export factory such as long hours, lack of ventilation
and access to drinking water, inadequate lighting and use of strong chemicals4.
3See World Bank (2006)
4A series of recent mass fainting in Cambodian export factories have bee associated with poor working
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This paper contributes to two strands of literature. First, it makes a contribution to the
study of the effects of trade, in particular exports, on educational investments in developing
countries. Heath and Mobarak (2014) study the impact of the explosion of the garments
industry in Bangladesh on educational investments in girls. They find that 5-10 year old
girls are more likely to be enrolled in school relative to their male siblings. The authors
interpret these results through garment jobs raising the returns to basic education, which is
necessary to obtain a job in the factory. The authors find no differential effect on households
where a female member is employed in the garments industry. We find that the gains in
girls’ schooling are concentrated in the 10 to 15 age cohort in household with a female
member at the eligible age to obtain a job in the factory. This evidence rules the channel
through which the arrival of export jobs raises the return to educating girls because factory
work require basic education. This suggests that the apparel export jobs may have different
skill requirements in different countries, and this may have different implications for the
returns to educating girls in those countries. In the case of Mexico, Atkin (2012) finds
that school dropout increased in municipalities on which there was expansion of export
manufacturing opportunities, as the arrival of low-skilled manufacturing jobs raised the
opportunity cost of schooling. The second strand of literature to which this paper is related
is the literature on intra-household bargaining which finds that employment and income
opportunities for women affect household decision making by changing the bargaining
power within he household (Strauss and Thomas (1995). Behrman (1997)). This is explained
by the fact that women have a relatively stronger preference for child’s goods than men do.
Additionally Duflo (2003) and Qian (2008) present evidence which suggests that that women
have a stronger preference for expenditure on female children. The evidence presented in
this paper is consistent with this latter mechanism.
The paper proceeds as follows: In section 2.2 I describe the rise of the Cambodian
garment industry and the characteristics of women and work in the garment export factories.
I continue with presenting the identification challenges and empirical strategy in section
conditions and inadequate nutrition (Thul, 2011).
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2.3. Section 2.4 discusses the estimation results and possible mechanisms. In section 2.5, I
present a robustness check for the identification assumption. Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 The Garment Industry in Cambodia and Its Effects on Women
2.2.1 Background
Close to half a million people are employed in the garment export sector in Cambodia, and
more than 80 percent of workers are young women (Garment Manufacturers Association in
Cambodia, 2014). As shown in Figure 2.1, Cambodia’s apparel exports have experienced
significant growth in the last twenty years. In 2013, exports of apparel totaled 4.9 billion
dollars, and accounted for 80 percent of exports and 20 percent of GDP (Garment Manu-
facturers Association in Cambodia, 2014). Close to half of apparel exports (41 percent) go
to the United States, 35 percent to the European Union, and the rest to Japan, Canada and
other markets (Garment Manufacturers Association in Cambodia, 2014). The world’s largest
clothing retailers source apparel from Cambodian factories.
The Cambodian garment industry started to develop after peace was restored and
normal trade and political relations were re-established with the rest of the world5. The
catalyst of the garment industry was the granting of Normal Trade Relations (or MFN)
status by the United States. This agreement was signed by Congress in September 1996,
and came into force in 1997. The tariff treatment of exports to the United States changed
from “Column 2” tariffs to “General” tarrifs with ad-valorem export tariffs declining by
30 percentage points on average, and by 55 percentage points in garments. Unconstrained
5The communist Khmer Rouge regime took control of Cambodia in 1975 under the leadership of Pol Pot.
The regime followed radical policies with the aim of transforming Cambodia into a “self-reliant” country, free
of “foreign corruption”. This entailed forced relocation of the entire urban population to villages, the creation
of forced labor camps, abolition of all political and civil rights, private property, and education, as well as mass
murders and executions Chandler (2014). It is estimated that approximately 1.7 million people (21 percent of
the country’s population) died as a result of executions, starvation and diseases from 1975 to 1979 (Cambodia
Genocide Program, 2014). The regime fell after Vietnam invaded Cambodia in 1979 and a pro-Vietnamese
government was established. The population returned to the cities, private property was restored, and schools
were re-opened. In the late 1980’s Vietnam withdrew from Cambodia. The first elections were held in 1993 and
Cambodia became a constitutional monarchy Chandler (2014).
51
Figure 2.1: Cambodia’s Exports to the United States 1992-2011
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by quotas which dominated textile and apparel trade under the Multi-Fiber Agreement
(MFA), Cambodia’s exports to the United States surged rapidly from 4 million in 1996 to
100 million in 1997 and 300 million in 1998. Pressure from industry groups within the
United States who were interested in limiting the surge in US imports from Cambodia
and anti-sweatshop activists, who were concerned about working conditions, led the US
Congress to draft a new trade agreement with Cambodia – known as the Textile and Apparel
Trade Agreement (TATA) – which linked increased market access to improvement in labor
and working conditions in export factories. The largest export categories (approximately 50
percent of exports) were brought under quota restrictions. The agreement stipulated that
base quota allocations would increase by 6 percent each year and bonus quota increases
of up to 15 percent annually (18 percent after 2001) would be granted conditional on the
improvement in working conditions and enforcement of Cambodia’s national labor laws.
The annual quota increases were very generous relative to other countries, and allowed a
continued growth of apparel exports (Dasgupta et al., 2001).
To be able to monitor and report the status and progress of labor conditions featured in
TATA, the International Labor Organization (ILO) established Better Factories Cambodia
(BFC), an entity whose mandate was to monitor and report on the status the labor and
working conditions in the export factories6. Participation in the program was mandatory
for all factories willing to export to the US under quota. The project was financed by the
US government and involved the participation of the garment manufacturers’ association
and Cambodian union federations and ministries (Chiu, 2007). When TATA ended together
with the MFA in January 2004, BFC continued to operate in the country and monitor the
working conditions in the factory. Today, each factory who wants to receive an export
license must be monitored by the BFC. International buyers can subscribe to BFC’s service
to access individual monitoring data on the factories. As international buyers were keen
6During factory visits, the BFC monitors interview managers and workers, review documents and make
direct observations of factory conditions based on Cambodia’s labor law and international labor law. The areas
of labor law the are covered during visits are discrimination, forced labor, child labor, freedom of association
and collective bargaining, compensation, working hours, contracts, and occupational safety and health (Better
Factories Cambodia, 2014)
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to dismiss their association with sweatshop work at the end of the 1990s, the continued
growth of Cambodia’s exports despite quantitative restrictions has often been attributed to
the “sweatshop-free” image associated with TATA and BFC’s establishment (Chiu (2007),
Dasgupta et al. (2001)).
As of 2013, the membership of the Garment Manufacturers Association of Cambodia
(GMAC) - a requirement for any factory engaged in exporting - was of 426 factories. The
number of export factories increased by more than 10 fold since 1996 when the association
was created. The majority of export factories are owned by entrepreneurs from China,
Hong Kong, Taiwan and Korea. All fabrics and accessories used in Cambodia are imported
because of the near-absence of upstream industries (United States Agency for International
Development , USAID). More than 90 percent of the export factories are located in and
around the capital of Phnom Penh, and concentrated in three districts of the Phnom Penh
province (Dangkor, Mean Chey, Russey Keo). From Phnom Penh containers are transported
to the deep-sea port of Sihanoukville, which is 230 kilometers away from Phnom Penh.
2.2.2 Women and Garment Work in Cambodia
As it is the case for most apparel export jobs, young women account for a disproportionate
share of employment in export factories. The 2004 household survey data reveals that
approximately 80 percent of all paid employees in apparel industries were women. More
than 90 percent of them were young with ages between 15 and 30. Seventy percent of
workers have never been married and still reside with their parents. Mean statistics are
presented in table 2.1. The women typically originate from larger families (of more than 6
members) who are primarily engaged in rice cultivation. In most cases they represent the
bread-winners of their families (83 percent of household members with paid jobs).
The majority of the women employed in garments reside in the villages on the outskirts
of the capital and in the surrounding provinces. Figure 2.2 presents the geographical
distribution of migrant workers in export factories in the Phnom Penh province based on
the 1998 population census data. Proximity to the capital is associated with higher district
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics of Garment Workers
Non-Garment Worker Garment Worker
Age 35.4 23.7
Female 0.5 0.8
Never-married 0.3 0.71
Household Size 5.6 6.3
Years of schooling 6.1 6.41
Can Read 0.7 0.92
Mother's education 0.8 0.44
Hourly wage (median, 2004 Riels) 700 1,041
Share of number of days present at home 1.0 0.57
Rural 0.8 0.8
Relationship to Household Head (Son/Daughter) 0.3 0.74
Notes: Results based on 2004 Household Survey. Sample is all individuals with age above 15.
employment in garments. In the 2004 household survey, the questions regarding the number
of days individual is present in the household reveal that garment workers are more likely
than workers in other occupations to spend time away from the household. This is true
primarily for workers whose families reside in villages from the provinces surrounding the
capital.
The export garment sector represents an import source of paid employment for young
women. Paid jobs represent only a quarter of employment, with more than half of young
women reporting their main occupation to be unpaid family workers. Of paid jobs, apparel
represents close to half of all employment opportunities. The rest of paid jobs are in
agriculture and fisheries (18%), services (19%) and housework for other households (12%).
Export factory jobs are low-skilled jobs and require little education7. In the 2004 survey,
7Derks (2008) describes the factory selection process based on field research work: “When factories recruit
new workers they tell them to spread the word among relatives and friends. When large numbers of new
workers are sought, factories hang a sign outside the factory with information about their call for workers and
the date and time of selection. Such an occasion attracts tens to hundreds of women, who stand for hours at
the gate of the factory, waiting for someone to come out and start the selection procedure. A supervisor of a
particular section in a factory will come out and choose potential workers randomly from the mass, choices more
often based on appearance, height and healthy looks than on any demonstrated skills.[..] Factory managers
claim, however, that the criteria for selection are not random or based on beauty. Instead, they are often related
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Figure 2.2: Migration to Phnom Penh Apparel Factories in 1998
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more than 90 percent of the women report being employed as machine operators and
assemblers. Workers on average have completed 6 years of education – this is 0.3 years more
than other women who are not employed in paid occupations, and more than a year less
than women employed in other paid jobs. A simple selection equation of employment in
garments presented in Table 2.2 shows that the probability of obtaining a job in a garment
factory is negatively associated with any previous school attendance and years of schooling
have a diminishing effect on the likelihood of obtaining a job in the factory. The impact of
schooling after six years of education becomes negative. This implies that the returns to
education with the purpose of obtaining a factory job are very high for primary education
(essentially literacy) and much lower for secondary education. These relationships need
to be interpreted with a lot of caution as both factory jobs and education may be jointly
determined by unobserved individual ability for which we cannot control here.
Despite their low-skill content, export jobs in the garment sector pay significantly more
than other jobs in the economy for the same level of education and experience. The positive
relationship between wages and exporting has been well-documented in other countries.
The median wage for a garment worker reported in the 2004 socio-economic survey was of
55 US dollars per month (0.26 dollars per hour), more than twice as much as wages paid in
other jobs occupied by women. At a descriptive level, the household survey data show no
correlation between a worker’s level of education and wages within the garment industry. A
simple Mincer regression presented in Table 2.2 of a worker’s wage level while controlling
for age and experience shows that there are no returns to education in the garments industry
beyond the 6 percent increase in wages if the female worker has ever attended school. This is
not the case for other jobs in the economy where an additional year of schooling contributes
to 9 percent increase in wages. The last column of Table 2.2 shows that there are declining
to the particular manufacturing procedures for which new workers are sought. For some procedures, such
as knitting, height and literacy are important in order to be able to handle the machine and read the knitting
patterns, whereas working in quality control does not require any specific skills or stature. Some factories
conduct a second selection procedure, or test, after the initial one, when they take a closer look at the capacities
of a woman, such as the ability to sew a straight line or handle a machine. When a woman passes this test, she
will be further trained in a specific procedure.“
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Table 2.2: The Relationship between Education and Garment Jobs and Wages
Female 0.00766*** -1.750** -0.385
(0.00259) (0.739) (0.271)
Years of schooling 0.00246*** -0.0385 0.0932***
(0.000715) (0.0483) (0.0121)
Years of schooling ^2 -0.000105*
(5.66e-05)
Ever attended School (=1) -0.00492*** -0.316** -0.0210
(0.00138) (0.144) (0.0677)
Ever attended School (=1) x Female -0.0247*** 0.381** -0.0663
(0.00428) (0.160) (0.0896)
Years of schooling x Female 0.0155*** -0.0381 0.0115
(0.00210) (0.0438) (0.0144)
Years of schooling ^2 x Female -0.00100***
(0.000146)
Observations 59,432 1,244 6,929
R-squared 0.054 0.233 0.240
Individual is 
enaged in 
garments (=1)
Hourly wage, 
garment workers 
(ln)
Hourly wage, 
other waged 
workers(ln)
Notes: The unit of observation is an individual. The specifications in columns (2) and (3) contain age, age-squared, 
female-age, female-age-squared, third-degree polynomial of experience and its interactions with female dummy. All 
standard errors are clustered at the district level.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
returns to education in the garment industry, and positive returns to education in other
sectors after controlling for age and experience. After obtaining a household diploma,
wage levels in other professions, such as teachers, life sciences, other professionals and
management jobs are on average higher than wages in the garment industry.
2.2.3 Conceptual Framework
The arrival of garments export jobs can affect the relative investments in education for girls
through various channels. We discuss four of these channels below.
First, apparel export jobs may increase the desirability of investing in girls’ education
relative to boys’ by increasing parents’ perceptions of daughter’s future earnings relative to
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her male siblings. This channel assumes that a woman’s education increases the probability
of obtaining a factory job and that there are returns to education in the garments industry.
The returns to education channel is highlighted in Heath and Mobarak (2014) in the context
of the garment industry in Bangladesh. The authors find that the arrival of garment factory
jobs was associated with an increase in enrollment of girls relative to boys in the 5-10 age
cohort.
However, export jobs may also increase the opportunity cost of staying in school if the
skill content of these jobs is very low. It has been widely documented that export jobs pay
higher wages than jobs in domestic firms. In Cambodia, export garment jobs pay more than
twice on average relative to other jobs available to women in the economy. Atkin (2012)
establishes this channel in the case of Mexico’s export manufacturing expansion. In the case
of Cambodia, education has a diminishing return on the likelihood of obtaining a job in
the apparel factory which suggests that the desirability of enrolling girls in school should
be highest for the first years of education, most likely in the 5-10 age cohort. The returns
to staying in school decline with the years of accumulated schooling.The opportunity cost
of staying in school for women after age 15 (the minimum age of working in a factory)
should be very high. This suggests that in the context of Cambodia, the returns-to-education
channel should be very strong for younger cohorts and not-existent for older cohorts of
children. Moreover, this channel should affect all households in the provinces surrounding
Phnom Penh, irrespective of whether they have a household member employed in the
garment factory or not. We can use the sample of households with no female members at
the eligible age to work in the factory (15 to 30) to test this channel.
A second channel is that a member working in garments raises total household income
and this should increase investments in education for girls if girls education is a luxury good
relative to boys’ education. This channel can be easily tested by examining whether girls’
likelihood of attending or staying in school relative to boys is increasing with household
income in the sample of households with no member employed in a garment factory. The
district fixed effects specification shows that girls’ likelihood to be enrolled in school is
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Table 2.3: Children’s School Enrollment and Household Income
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Household Income Per Capita (ln) 0.018*** 0.003
(0.003) (0.002)
Female x Household Income Per Capita(ln) 0.003 0.006 0.007*** 0.008
(0.004) (0.008) (0.003) (0.006)
Controls (for all panels)
Female, Age, Age Squared Controls Y Y Y Y
Female-Age, Female Age-squared Interactions Y Y Y Y
Mother Education, Household Size Y N Y N
Mother Education -Female, Household Size -Female Interactions Y Y Y Y
Household Fixed Effects N Y N Y
Clustering (district, 79) Y Y Y Y
Observations 7,550 7,550 6,921 6,921
Notes: The unit of observation is an individual i in household h in district d.The sample includes households with no member employed in the
garment industry. The sample is restricted to individuals below 15 years of age. The controls included are indicated in the table by Y(yes) or
N(No). Coefficients are reported with standard errors clustered in parentheses clustered at the district level, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Individual Is Currently 
Attending School  Individual Stayed in School
higher in households with higher income per capita. But the gender-income-per-capita
interaction is not significant in the household fixed effect specification, suggesting that when
holding (unobserved) family background constant, daughters are not more likely than sons
to be enrolled in school, partially refuting the luxury good hypotheses.
Third, by increasing female-specific income garment jobs may increase older daughter’s
bargaining power within the household. If older female siblings have a higher preference
for investing in their sisters education, garment jobs will tend to increase the investment
in education for girls. This mechanism has been highlighted by (Qian, 2008) and Duflo
(2003). This explanation is most consistent with with non-unitary model of the household.
The unitary model makes the strong prediction that an increase in income should have the
same effect on household consumption and investment regardless of which member of the
household brings home the additional income. A test of this channel entails examining
what happens with household investment and consumption in response to male and female
income increases. Different responses of investments in education of girls and boys in
response to shocks to male and female income will rule out the second channel.
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Finally, older sisters and other young women from the village who are employed outside
the household in a formal job may represent role models for their younger siblings. This
may influence their attitudes and self-confidence, which in turn may affect their likelihood
of staying in school. Existing research has shown that exposure to strong female role models
can alter the behavior of women (Beaman et al. (2012), Jensen and Oster (2009)). Under the
assumption that role models are not restricted to the household, this channel can be ruled
out by looking at the relative enrollment rates in household with no eligible member to work
in the factory. Because the likelihood of working in the factory is positively correlated with
the distance to the Phnom Penh garment cluster, distance should also affect the presence of
role models factory workers.
The first, second and last explanations are consistent with both the unitary and non-
unitary models of household decision making. The first and fourth explanations can be
ruled out by looking at the relative propensity of girls to be enrolled in school relative to
boys in households in which all female members have passed the prime age of working in
the factory. Proximity to the factory should positively affect the returns to investing in girls
irrespective of whether an older sibling works in the factory. Similarly, young girls should
be exposed to female factory workers irrespective of whether an older sibling works in the
factory. To be able to distinguish between the second and third explanation one needs to
use an exogenous increase in male generated income and test its effect on the education of
female and male siblings within the household. We are not aware of shocks that increase
the income opportunities of Cambodian men. But we will make use of the information
contained in the part of the households in the sample in which a son is employed in the
apparel industry.
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2.3 Empirical Strategy
2.3.1 Data and Samples
The data used to investigate the effect of factory jobs on siblings education comes from
Cambodia’s Socio-Economic Survey (CSES) of 2004 conducted by National Institute of
Statistics8. The survey was conducted in a nationwide representative sample of 15,000
households within 900 sampling units (villages).
The 2004 data allows us to identify the households with members employed in the
apparel industry and to observe the individual education variables at the household level.
Importantly, the survey contains information on all household members irrespective of
whether they do not reside in the household. This is very important in the context of
Cambodia because the garment factory workers migrate temporarily to Phnom Penh to take
the jobs in the garment factories. Our primary dependent variable of interest is an indicator
variable for whether an individual residing in a given household is currently enrolled in
school. We use a secondary outcome variable for whether an individual continues to attend
school provided they have attended school in the past. This second dependent variable
measures the likelihood of individuals of staying in school and applies to a fewer number
of individuals than the first dependent variable.
There are 1,295 individuals in the survey who report the industry of their main occu-
pation to be manufacture of apparel, and 916 households in which at least one household
member is employed in apparel. We call these households “garment” households. Ap-
proximately 90 percent of the households are within 150 kilometers from the center of
Phnom Penh, and we restrict the sample to these districts. This ensures that the households
and individuals are more comparable to one another. For the purpose of the instrumental
variable analysis, we restrict our sample to households in which at least one female member
8The CSES is a household survey with questions to households and individual household members,
including modules on education and literacy, current economic activity, migration, housing conditions, durable
goods, construction activities, nutrition, fertility and child care, child feeding and vaccination, health of children,
mortality health and illness. The Survey has been previously conducted in the years 1993/94, 1996, 1997 and
1999. Since 2007 the survey has been conducted annually.
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Table 2.4: Summary Statistics of Variables Used in the Regression
Currently 
Continuing 
School
Currently 
Attending 
School Female Age
Years of 
Schooling
Household 
Size
Mother's 
Education
Male 0.96 0.86 . 8.53 3.22 6.22 0.45
(0.19) (0.34) . (4.43) (2.51) (1.92) (0.45)
.
Female 0.92 0.84 1 8.98 3.56 6.22 0.46
(0.27) (0.37) . (4.69) (2.69) (1.94) (0.45)
Total 0.94 0.85 0.5 8.76 3.39 6.22 0.46
(0.24) (0.35) (0.50) (4.57) (2.61) (1.93) (0.45)
Notes: All individuals with ages below 15 in the sample of households with at least one female member aged 15 to 
30.
is young, i.e in the age cohort 15 to 30, and to individuals below working age. We also
exclude from the sample those households who have migrated after 1993 to ensure that our
results will not be contaminated by migrant families which respond endogenously to the
expansion of employment opportunities for girls.
The second source of data are distances from the district towns to Phnom Penh. These
distances were obtained using Google Maps data, and are calculated from the district capital
to the center of Phnom Penh. Ideally, one would use the distance from the villages where
the household resides to the closest export factory, but this data is not yet available.
2.3.2 Empirical Specification
We investigate the impact of having a female household member employed in the garment
industry by estimating the following empirical specification:
Sihd = dd + bgGihd + b f GihdFemalei + XiG+ XiFemaleiQ+ XhF+ XhFemaleiY+ # ihd (2.1)
The index i denotes individuals, h denotes households, and d denotes districts. The
outcome variable Sihd is an indicator variable for whether individual i in household h
in district d is currently attending school. We also investigate the outcome of continued
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school attendance, which is the probability of attending school given that the individual has
previously attended school. Gihd is an indicator variable for whether individual i residing in
household h in district d has a female employed in the garment industry; Xi is a vector of
individual characteristics such as gender, age, and age-gender and interactions; Xh is a vector
of household characteristics such as household size and the level of education of the mother,
which might influence the propensity of an individual in the household to be enrolled in
school; dd is a district fixed effect which controls for unobserved geographical characteristics
which may affect the enrollment of children in school. The coefficient bg measures the
average propensity of being enrolled in school for a child residing in a household with at
least one female member working in the apparel industry, and the coefficient b f measures
the differential propensity of being enrolled in school if the gender of the child is female.
We also estimate equation 2.1 using household fixed effects. This entails that the
comparisons of the propensity to be enrolled in school are only based on siblings within
the same household. Holding household background constant potentially increases the
precision of our estimates, but it also entail a further restriction of the sample to larger
households, which have at least one male and one female child. The effect of Gihd and
the controls Xh will get absorbed by the household fixed effect. In this specification, b f
measures the differential propensity to be enrolled in school for a female sibling relative to
her male sibling within the same household.
The main challenge in identifying the causal effect of apparel export jobs on the edu-
cation of siblings arises from joint determination. If unobserved household characteristics
influence both a household’s propensity to send a daughter to work in an export factory
and preferences for education of younger female siblings relative to male siblings, the OLS
estimate will be biased. One such example is a high bargaining weight of the mother within
the household. A strong mother would be able to both negotiate the migration of an older
daughter to Phnom Penh to work in the factory and the continued enrollment of younger
daughters into school. Its omission from the regression would cause the OLS estimate to be
biased upwards.
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The selection bias can be avoided by finding an instrument for household’s propensity to
send a daughter to work in an apparel factory. Because the majority of garment workers need
to migrate from their villages to work in a garment factory, an instrument that generates
exogenous variation in migration costs is a good candidate. We use the distance from
the district where the household resides to the closest garment cluster in Phnom Penh
to instrument for a household’s propensity to send a household member to work in the
factory. The map in Figure 2.2 shows that proximity to the capital is strongly associated
with individual’s propensity to migrate to take a job in the export factory. As discussed
earlier, we apply this instrument within the sample of households with at least one female
member in the age cohort of 15 to 30, which is the prime ages of working the garment
export factories, while further restricting the sample to provinces surrounding the capital.
Causal inference requires the assumption that distance to the closest garment cluster in
Phnom Penh within the sample of households with a woman at eligible age only affects the
propensity of young girls to be enrolled in school relative to their male siblings through the
older female sibling’s propensity of working in the apparel industry. For the instrument to
satisfy the exclusion restriction, it is necessary to restrict the sample to sibling below the
minimum working age in the garment factories which is 159. Otherwise, assuming that
export factory work increases the opportunity costs of schooling, proximity to the factory
directly affects the educational choices of children at working age.
In a two-stage least squares(2SLS) framework, equation 2.1 is the second stage of the
2SLS system and equation 2.2 below is the first stage
Gihd = aln(distPPd) + XiG+ XhF+ # ihd (2.2)
where ln(distPPd) is the natural log of the distance to Phnom Penh from the district
9According to the regulations set out by Better Factories Cambodia, factories that employ workers under
age 18 are subject to additional requirements such as, maintaining a register of workers under age 18, getting
consent from their guardians for them to work, etc. In practice, the detection of underage work is problematic
because Cambodia does not maintain a universal birth registration system and and falsification of age-verifying
documents is common. However, the monitoring done by BFC (usually through visual checks) ensures that a
minimum age is requirement is largely observed by the factories. The existence of a monitoring body most
likely contributes to the reduction of underage work in the export factories
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where individual i belonging to household h resides. A natural concern for the exclusion
restriction is that the proximity to the garment cluster affects the relative propensity of girls
below working age to be enrolled or stay enrolled in school though channels other than
the propensity of having an older female sibling employed in the factory. As discussed
earlier, proximity to the factory may directly affect educational investments of girls relative
to boys by changing the returns to investing in school and by providing women with role
models that my directly change their beliefs and behavior. These channels should be active
for both girls residing in eligible households and girls residing in non-eligible households.
In tables 2.7 and 2.8 we estimate the reduced form of 2.2 including all individuals below
the minimum working age in households without a female member between ages 15 and
30, and then further restricting the sample to individuals below the minimum work age.
The results show that educational choices of siblings in families that do not have at least
one eligible woman to work in the factory are not affected by proximity to the factory. The
second threat to the exogeneity assumption is that the proximity to Phnom Penh also affects
the likelihood of older female siblings of obtaining paid jobs that are not in the garment
sector. One such example would be work in the government, which accounts for a quarter of
jobs for women in that age group. We show that the distance to Phnom Penh measure is only
weakly associated with other paid employment opportunities for women, and that female
paid work outside of the garment industry has no effect education of younger siblings.
2.4 Estimation Results
OLS Estimates
The results of estimating equation 2.1 by OLS are presented in Table 2.5 panel A. The first
two columns present the results of using the dummy variable that an individual is currently
enrolled in school, using the district and household fixed effects specifications. The last
two columns use as outcome a dummy variable for whether an individual is currently
enrolled in school given that they previously attended school.The results in the first column
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show that boys in households with at least one female member working in the apparel
industry are less likely to attend school than boys in households with no female member
engaged in apparel, but the results are not statistically significant. The coefficient on the
gender interaction is positive, and again not significant. This is true for both the district and
household fixed effects specifications. The OLS results are significant when investigating the
likelihood of staying in school, which restricts the sample to children who have previously
attended school. The effect of having a household female member in garments is again
negative suggesting that boys in these households are more likely to drop out of school.
The coefficient on the female gender interaction is positive, significant, and of larger
magnitude. The total effect of a female member working in apparel is positive on female
siblings. Younger female siblings are 2 percentage points more likely to be enrolled in
school if a a female household member is working in the factory. These results are robust to
using household fixed effects which compares male and female siblings within the same
household. The female gender interaction in the household fixed effects specification is
larger - this is to be expected since the estimation is based on a sample composed of larger
families (who have both a female and a male sibling) which may be poorer in average. For
these poorer families, the employment of a daughter in an export factory might have a
larger effect on the education of girls.
First Stage and Reduced Form
The reduced-form and first-stage estimates of equation 2.2 are shown in panels B and D
of Table 2.5. The first stage estimates in panel D, columns (1) show that there is a strong
positive relationship between the instrument and the likelihood that a household has a
female member engaged in apparel production. The Kleibergen-Paap statistic is above
20 for the household fixed effects specifications but below 10 when using district fixed
effects. This suggests that we should not worry about our estimates being biased by weak
instruments in the household fixed effects specifications, but that we should interpret the
2SLS estimates with caution in the district fixed effects specification. A household living 10
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Table 2.5: The Impact of Factory Work on Siblings’ Education: Individuals Below 15 Years Old
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Household Has Female Member in Apparel Job -0.017 -0.031
(0.022) (0.020)
Female x Household Has Female Member in Apparel Job 0.030 0.048 0.058** 0.101**
(0.029) (0.050) (0.026) (0.046)
ln (Distance to Phnom Penh) -0.015 0.007
(0.013) (0.009)
Female x ln (Distance to Phnom Penh) -0.021** -0.031** -0.026*** -0.028**
(0.011) (0.015) (0.010) (0.012)
Household Has Female Member in Apparel Job 0.214 -0.096
(0.190) (0.125)
Female x Household Has Female Member in Apparel Job 0.384* 0.407** 0.400** 0.344***
(0.208) (0.159) (0.168) (0.108)
ln (Distance to Phnom Penh) -0.066*** -0.067***
(0.014) (0.014)
Female x ln (Distance to Phnom Penh) -0.076*** -0.082***
(0.023) (0.026)
Kleibergen-Paap F Statistic 6.02 22.265 6.711 21.321
Controls (for all panels)
Female, Age, Age Squared Controls Y Y Y Y
Female-Age, Female Age-squared Interactions Y Y Y Y
Mother Education, Household Size Y N Y N
Mother Education -Female, Household Size -Female Interactions Y Y Y Y
Household Fixed Effects N Y N Y
Clustering (district, 79) Y Y Y Y
Observations 4,066 3,140 3,724 2,794
Panel A: OLS Estimates
Panel B: Reduced Form Estimates
Panel C: 2SLS Estimates
Panel D: First Stage Estimates
Notes: The unit of observation is an individual i in household h in district d. The sample includes 2942 households surveyed in the year 2004. The
sample includes households with at least one female member between the ages 15 and 30. The controls included are indicated in the table by
Y(yes) or N(No). Coefficients are reported with standard errors clustered in parentheses clustered at the district level, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1. In panel D we report first-stage Kleibergen-Paap F-Statistics.
Dependent Variable = 
Individual Is Currently 
Attending School
Dependent Variable = 
Individual Stayed in 
School
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kilometers away from the nearest garment cluster in Phnom Penh is 13 percentage point
(half a standard deviation) more likely to have a female household member employed as a
factory worker than a household living 100 kilometers away. These predicted magnitudes
are in line with what we would expect. The share of households involved in garments
declines by 10 percentage points as we move from a district situated 10 kilometers away to a
district situated 100 kilometers away from Phnom Penh.
In panel B, the reduced-form effects of our distance instrument on the outcomes of
interest show that proximity to the Phnom Penh garment cluster is positively and statistically
significant associated with higher relative likelihood of girls to be enrolled relative to boys
in both in both the within-district and within household specification.
2SLS Estimates
The 2SLS estimates of equation 2.2 are presented in Panel C of Table 2.5. According
to the estimates a household with at least one female member employed in a garment
factory increases the likelihood of girls enrollment in schools relative to their brothers by
40 percentage points and the likelihood of staying in school by 30 percentage points in the
fixed effects specification. These magnitudes are around one standard deviation for both
outcomes variables, and significantly larger than the OLS estimates. This suggests that the
OLS coefficients were downward biased. One reason for the downward bias might be that
households that are poorer and hence less likely to be able to send their younger daughters
to school may also be more likely to send a daughter to work in the garment factory. As
it is the case for all instrumental variable estimates, our 2SLS estimates reflect the average
effect on observations that respond or comply to our distance instrument, namely the local
average treatment effect (Angrist and Imbens, 1994). In the current setting, the compliers are
households who send an older daughter to work in the factory because of its proximity to
Phnom Penh. Our estimates are not driven by households whose decision to send an older
daughter to work in the factory is not affected by the proximity to the factory.
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Mechanisms
The conceptual framework presented in section 2.2.3 identified four main channels through
which the employment of an older female sibling in an export factory may differentially
affect the investment in education of female relative to male siblings. In this section we
present evidence to support or rule out some of these channels.
The differential returns to the education of female and male siblings can be ruled out
in two ways, depending on the assumptions regarding the information households have
regarding factory jobs. One scenario is that households only have information on the
education requirements to obtain a job in the factory if one household member works in the
factory. The second scenario is that proximity to the export clusters is positively correlated
with information on the education requirements of export jobs, irrespective of whether one
of the household members works in the factory.
Under the first information scenario, we present evidence that rules out the differential
returns to the education of female and male siblings by looking at heterogeneous effects in
the 5-9 and 10-15 age cohorts. As discussed in section 2.2.3, the higher relative propensity to
attend school of younger sibling could be a response to the returns to education channel if it
shows up for the young cohort of siblings. We find that the positive impact of female factory
work on female household members are concentrated in the 10 to 15 age cohort, and they
are non-existent in the 5 to 9 age cohort. The results for the 10 to 15 age cohort are presented
in Table 2.6. The magnitude of the 2SLS coefficients in panel C is almost twice as large in
magnitude relative to the coefficients reported in Table 2.5. The estimated coefficients in
the 5 to 9 age cohort are not statistically significant. For the second information scenario,
we present evidence showing that proximity to the Phnom Penh garment cluster does not
affect the relative enrollment rates of female siblings in households who do not have a
young female member. These placebo results are presented in Table 2.7 and Table 2.8 for all
individuals and the 10 to 15 age cohort. The gender interaction coefficient is close to zero
and not significant for both the within-district and within household specifications, for both
outcome variables.
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Table 2.6: The Impact of Factory Work on Siblings’ Education: Individuals in the 10 - 15 Age Cohort
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Household Has Female Member in Apparel Job -0.044* -0.042
(0.026) (0.026)
Female x Household Has Female Member in Apparel Job 0.075** 0.103 0.068** 0.130
(0.037) (0.095) (0.033) (0.089)
ln (Distance to Phnom Penh) 0.007 0.012
(0.015) (0.013)
Female x ln (Distance to Phnom Penh) -0.041*** -0.066** -0.039*** -0.049*
(0.014) (0.027) (0.012) (0.026)
Household Has Female Member in Apparel Job -0.115 -0.187
(0.238) (0.189)
Female x Household Has Female Member in Apparel Job 0.552** 0.859*** 0.532*** 0.567***
(0.219) (0.282) (0.197) (0.206)
ln (Distance to Phnom Penh) -0.070*** -0.071***
(0.015) (0.015)
Female x ln (Distance to Phnom Penh) -0.077* -0.087*
(0.039) (0.046)
Kleibergen-Paap F Statistic 12.645 10.688 6.711 12.32
Controls (for all panels)
Female, Age, Age Squared Controls Y Y Y Y
Female-Age, Female Age-squared Interactions Y Y Y Y
Mother Education, Household Size Y N Y N
Mother Education -Female, Household Size -Female Interactions Y Y Y Y
Household Fixed Effects N Y N Y
Clustering (district, 79) Y Y Y Y
Observations 2,761 1,790 2,702 1,722
Panel A: OLS Estimates
Panel B: Reduced Form Estimates
Panel C: 2SLS Estimates
Panel D: First Stage Estimates
Notes: The unit of observation is an individual i in household h in district d. The sample includes 2942 households surveyed in the year 2004.The
sample includes households with at least one female member between the ages 15 and 30. The sample is restricted to individuals above 10 years
of age. The controls included are indicated in the table by Y(yes) or N(No). Coefficients are reported with standard errors clustered in parentheses
clustered at the district level, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. In panel D we report first-stage Kleibergen-Paap F-Statistics.
Dependent Variable = 
Individual Is Currently 
Attending School
Dependent Variable = 
Individual Stayed in 
School
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Table 2.7: Enrollment in School in Households with No Female Household Member in the 15-30 Age Cohort:
Individuals Below 15 Years Old
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln (Distance to Phnom Penh) -0.022*** -0.000
(0.008) (0.005)
Female x ln (Distance to Phnom Penh) 0.002 0.011 -0.001 0.001
(0.008) (0.014) (0.005) (0.009)
Controls (for all panels)
Female, Age, Age Squared Controls Y Y Y Y
Female-Age, Female Age-squared Interactions Y Y Y Y
Mother Education, Household Size Y N Y N
Mother Education -Female, Household Size -Female Interactions Y Y Y Y
Household Fixed Effects N Y N Y
Clustering (district, 79) Y (79) Y (79) Y (79) Y (79)
Observations 3,758 3,758 2,479 2,479
Notes: The unit of observation is an individual i in household h in district d. The sample includes 2008 households surveyed in the year
2004.The sample includes households with no female member between the ages 15 and 30. The controls included are indicated in the table
by Y(yes) or N(No). Coefficients are reported with standard errors clustered in parentheses clustered at the district level, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1.
Dependent Variable = 
Individual Is Currently 
Attending School
Dependent Variable = 
Individual Stayed in 
School
 Reduced Form Estimates
The role model channel discussed in section 2.2.3 can be fully ruled out with the same
placebo tests presented in Table 2.7 and Table 2.8, under the assumption that girls’ behavior
and attitudes can be changed by non-sibling role models. The economic literature on the
role-model effect does not distinguish between family and non-family role models, but most
of the evidence in this area comes that role models outside shape the educational and career
choices of young girls.
As discussed in section 2.2.3, to be able to distinguish between the second channel, (the
investments in education of girls is a luxury good) and the third channel (that increased
female income is associated with increased bargaining power of women within the house-
hold) one would need to test whether changes to male income have the same effect on the
educational investment of girls relative to boys, as increases in female income. Unfortunately,
we are not aware of shocks to male specific income over the sample period in Cambodia.
We can make progress in disentangling these two channels by using the information
72
Table 2.8: Enrollment in School in Households with No Female Household Member in the 15-30 Age Cohort:
Individuals Individuals in the 10 - 15 Age Cohort
ln (Distance to Phnom Penh) -0.009 -0.002
(0.008) (0.008)
Female x ln (Distance to Phnom Penh) -0.000 0.018 -0.002 -0.006
(0.008) (0.030) (0.007) (0.022)
Controls (for all panels)
Female, Age, Age Squared Controls Y Y Y Y
Female-Age, Female Age-squared Interactions Y Y Y Y
Mother Education, Household Size Y N Y N
Mother Education -Female, Household Size -Female Interactions Y Y Y Y
Household Fixed Effects N Y N Y
Clustering (district, 79) Y (79) Y (79) Y (79) Y (79)
Observations 2,529 2,529 2,479 2,479
Notes: The unit of observation is an individual i in household h in district d. The sample includes 1667 households surveyed in the year 
2004.The sample includes households with no female member between the ages 15 and 30. The sample is restricted to indviduals with ages 
betwen 10 and below 15. The controls included are indicated in the table by Y(yes) or N(No). Coefficients are reported with standard errors 
clustered in parentheses clustered at the district level, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Dependent Variable = 
Individual Is Currently 
Attending School
Dependent Variable = 
Individual Stayed in 
School
 Reduced Form Estimates
on households with a male member employed in the factory. Under the assumption that
male income gains from garment factory work are of the same magnitude as female income
gains, we can test whether male income opportunities affect investment in girls in a similar
manner to female income opportunities. To be able to explore these effects, we expand the
sample to include households with at least one young member who is male (between ages
15 and 30). Within this sample we identify households with at least one“eligible” man but
no “eligible” woman. This is the sub-sample of households eligible to send a male migrant
member to work in the garment industry, but not a female garment migrant. We estimate
the within-household reduced form specification in the new sample.
Sihd = dh + b1MihdFemalei + b2MihdFemaleiln(distPPd)+
b3Femaleiln(distPPd) + XiFemaleiQ+ XhFemaleiY+ # ihd (2.3)
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Table 2.9: The Impact of Male Apparel Work on Siblings’ Education: Individuals Below 15 Years Old
Dependent 
Variable = 
Individual Is 
Currently 
Attending 
School
Dependent 
Variable = 
Individual 
Stayed in 
School
(2) (4)
Female x Household Has Female Member in Apparel Job 0.050 0.073
(0.049) (0.046)
Female x Household Has Male Member in Apparel Job 0.014 0.005
(0.060) (0.051)
Female x ln (Distance to Phnom Penh) -0.032** -0.028**
(0.015) (0.012)
Female x Household Has Eligible Men (age 15-30) No Eligible Women -0.182 -0.153*
(0.140) (0.089)
Female x Household Has Eligible Men (age 15-30) No Eligible Women 0.042 0.044*
x ln (Distance to Phnom Penh) (0.035) (0.024)
Controls (for all panels)
Female, Age, Age Squared Controls Y Y
Female-Age, Female Age-squared Interactions Y Y
Mother Education, Household Size N N
Mother Education -Female, Household Size -Female Interactions Y Y
Household Fixed Effects Y Y
Clustering (district, 79) Y Y
Observations 5,715 5,263
Panel A: OLS Estimates
Panel B: Reduced Form Estimates
Notes: The unit of observation is an individual I in ousehold h in district d. The sample includes 3415 households
surveyed in the year 2004.The sample includes households with at least one member between the ages 15 and 30.
The controls included are indicated in the table by Y(yes) or N(No). Coefficients are reported with standard errors
clustered in parentheses clustered at the district level, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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where Mihd is a dummy variable which equals 1 if individual i resides in a given
household h with at least one man in the age cohort of 15 to 30 but no woman in this age
cohort. If the household is unitary and the identity of the income recipient does not matter
then b2 = b3.
The results of estimating this equation are presented in Table 2.9. Panel A presents
the OLS results in the new sample of all households with at least one member in the age
cohort 15 to 30. Panel B presents the reduced form results from estimating equation 2.3.
The coefficient b2 is negative and significant for both outcome variables as in the earlier
specifications. The coefficients b3 are positive, significant and of larger magnitude (for
the second outcome variable) suggesting that girls in the households eligible to send only
male workers to work in the factory are not more likely to stay in school relative to their
male siblings. Meanwhile, proximity to the garment clusters positively affects the relative
likelihood of female siblings to be enrolled in school when the household has at least one
eligible member to work in the factory. While not definitive, this evidence is suggestive of
the bargaining power channel and of a non-unitary household model.
2.5 A Triple Difference Approach
A concern with the estimation strategy described in section 2.3 is that there might be
differences in the relative propensity of school enrollment for female and male siblings in
households with at least one “eligible” female member and which are positively correlated
with the proximity to the garment factories, which precede the granting of MFN status in
1996 by the US. As shown in Figure2.1, Cambodia’s exports of apparel to the US witnessed
a sharp increase in 1997 after the MFN status were granted and tariffs on the exports of
apparel products fell by 55 percentage points. The value of exports increased from 4 million
in 1996 to 1.4 billion dollars in 2004. We can account for any pre-existing differences in the
relative propensity to be attending school by taking advantage of the school enrollment
data prior to 1996, and using a triple difference estimation strategy which compares the
propensity of school enrollment of girls relative to boys within the same household (first
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difference), before and after the granting of MFN status (second difference) in districts with
varying proximity to the Phnom Penh garment cluster (third difference). We apply the
triple-difference estimator within the sample of household with and without an eligible
woman to work in the factory.
To summarize we estimate the following equation on an individual i residing in house-
hold h in district d and in time period t:
Sihdt = dht + b1Femalei + b2 I
(1=2004)
t Femalei + b3ln(distPP)dFemalei+
b4ln(distPP)dFemalei I
(1=2004)
t + XhtFemaleiG+ # ihdt (2.4)
where dht is a household fixed effect which will vary by year because the data is a
repeated cross-section, I(1=2004)t is a dummy for year 2004, and Xht is a vector of household
variables such as size and number of siblings. The coefficient b4 measure the change in the
enrollment of girls relative to their male siblings from 1996 to 2004 in households located at
varying proximity from the garment factories. The analysis so far predicts that b4 should be
negative - female siblings should be more likely to be enrolled in school relative to their
male siblings in 2004 after the tariff drop in districts that are closer to the export factories.
Ideally we would want to take advantage of more years prior to the reform to make sure
there are no preexisting trends in the outcome variable before the trade reform. However,
the one household survey data available is from 1993 and that does not contain districts
identifiers.
The results of estimating equation 6.1 are presented in Table 2.10. The first two columns
present the estimation results with the sample restricted to household with at least one
female household member of eligible age to work in the factory (15-30) in the age cohorts
5-9 and 10 to 15. The last two columns contain the estimation results for households with no
woman of eligible age. The coefficient b4 is negative and significant. The total difference in
enrollment between male and female siblings in 4 is equal to the sum of the coefficients b3
and b4, namely -0.068. This magnitude is almost equal and certainly within the confidence
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Table 2.10: The Effects of Garment Jobs on School Enrollment: Pre and After Comparisons
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Female -0.607 0.885 0.111 0.148
(1.559) (1.826) (1.587) (1.043)
Post (Year=2004) x Female 0.754 0.952 0.316 0.604
(0.552) (0.778) (0.382) (0.627)
Female x ln (Distance to Phnom Penh) 0.030 0.069 -0.001 0.008
(0.033) (0.079) (0.025) (0.043)
Post (Year=2004) x Female x ln (Distance to Phnom Penh) -0.098** -0.019 0.029 -0.001
(0.045) (0.103) (0.037) (0.072)
Observations 4,424 2,830 4,542 3,601
R-squared 0.722 0.891 0.738 0.852
Dependent Variable = Individual Is Currently 
Attending School
Notes: The unit of observation is an individual i in household h in district d. The sample includes households with at least one 
female member between the ages 15 and 30.  All regressions contain household fixed effects and controls for age, age 
squared, female indicator interacted with age and age squared, female indicator interacted with share of siblings in 
household, household size, mother's education. Standard errors clustered at the district level (79 clusters). *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1
Age Cohort 
10-15
Household with Female 
Member with Age 15 to 
30
Household with No 
Female Member with 
Age 15 to 30
Age cohort 
5-9
Age cohort 
5-9
Age Cohort 
10-15
interval of the reduced form coefficient from equation 2.2 presented in Table 2.6, panel
B, column 2. This suggests that the pre-reform differences in the relative propensity of
attending school for girls in the age cohort 10 to 15 in households residing close to Phnom
Penh were actually negative as captured by the coefficient b3 in equation 6.1. While this
coefficient is positive, it is not statistically significant suggesting that the within household
differences in enrollment of female and male siblings is not different from zero. Consistent
with the previous estimation results, we find no effect for young cohorts, aged 5 to 10, and
no effect for children residing in households with no female member of eligible age.
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2.6 Conclusion
This paper studied the impact of female factory work on household educational investments
in the context of Cambodia. We compared the propensity to attend school of a female sibling
relative to her brother in households with varying proximity to the export garment factories.
We found that in households who were induced to send a female member to work in the
garment factories by the proximity to the factories, young girls are one standard deviation
more likely to attend school relative to their male siblings. These effects are only significant
for the age cohort 10-15. A triple difference estimation strategy was used to ensure that
these differences in enrollment did not exist prior to 1997, when Cambodia obtained MFN
status from the US, and exports took off.
The evidence is consistent with qualitative evidence which suggests that part of the
income obtained from the factory is directed towards the education of younger siblings.
This suggests that by increasing income opportunities for young women, export factory
work may increase the bargaining power of older daughters within the household. Because
these women have different preferences for investing in their female and male siblings,
export factory work is associated with higher investment in education for young female
siblings. While the evidence is suggestive for the increased bargaining power channel, an
alternative channel in which girls’ education is a luxury good (possibly because of existing
norms regarding the role of women within the household) cannot be fully rules out without
an equal-sized shock to male income.
Interestingly, we find no effect on the arrival of garment jobs on the investments in girls’
relative propensity to enroll in school in households with no female member of eligible
age to work in the garment factory and residing in the neighboring provinces. This rules
out the channel that garment jobs alter the relative return to investing in girls’ schooling.
This channel was identified by Heath and Mobarak (2014) in the case of garment factory
expansions in Bangladesh. Oster and Millet (2013) and Jensen (2010) also found that the
arrival of IT service jobs in India increases girls schooling. One explanation for why the
return in channel is not present here is that the export garment jobs in Cambodia are very
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low-skilled jobs which require little or no education. This suggests that the expansion of
export manufacturing in the developing world will have different effects on young girls
depending on the skill content required for the product, and the average education levels
for girls in those countries.
79
Chapter 3
The Impacts of Fair Trade
Certification: Evidence From Coffee
Producers in Costa Rica1
3.1 Introduction
Fair Trade (FT) certification offers consumers the opportunity to help lift farmers in devel-
oping countries out of poverty. The appeal of Fair Trade to ethically-minded consumers is
illustrated by the impressive growth of Fair Trade certified imports over the past decade.
Since its inception in 1997, sales of Fair Trade certified products (under FLO International
/ Fairtrade International) have grown exponentially. Today, there are over 1.2 million FT-
certified farmers located in 66 different countries. Fair Trade products are now sold in over
120 countries (Fairtrade International, 2012).
The aim of this study is to provide an examination of the impacts of FT certification on
producers. We begin by examining the universe of coffee mills in Costa Rica from 1999 to
2010. We find that FT certification is associated with higher export prices (approx. 5 cents
per pound), but that there is no evidence that certification is associated with more sales
1Co-authored with Nathan Nunn
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(either domestic or for export) or with higher domestic prices. This is not surprising since
FT certification increases the price of coffee sold as Fair Trade – primarily exports – but does
not itself guarantee increased sales. In addition, the fact that we do not see large increases
in sales associated with FT certification provides some confidence that selection of ‘better’
coffee producers is not playing a large role. We also undertake a number of more formal
tests of selection into certification. We do not find evidence of certification being spurred by
increased sales, exports, or prices.
Having examined the effects of FT certifications at the producer level, we then turn to
an examination of broader impacts of Fair Trade certification by linking our information
on the locations of FT-certified mills to individual-level survey data. We construct a canton
(i.e., district) level measure of FT intensity (i.e., share of production that is from FT certified
producers) and examine the relationships between FT certification and individual incomes.
Our analysis directly tests for differential benefits of FT certification for individuals employed
in different parts of coffee production and those living in the area but not employed in
coffee. We find that Fair Trade certification leads to an increase in average income for all
households residing in the canton, but that the increase is concentrated only among the
skilled coffee growers and farm owners. The majority of the workers in the coffee industry –
who are those classified as unskilled or ‘other’ – do not see any benefits from Fair Trade.
We also find some evidence of small positive spill-over effects for individuals not working
in the coffee industry but living in cantons with Fair Trade certified coffee mills.
We also examine the impact of FT certification on the school attendance of children. Our
estimates show that FT certification has no impact on elementary school attendance. We also
find that FT certification is associated with lower school attendance among children of coffee
unskilled coffee workers. This could be due to increased economic opportunities that arise
due to FT certification, drawing children out of school and into the workforce. Although, we
do not find evidence of increased wages from FT certifications for the vast majority of the
workers, the increased wages to skilled coffee growers may be enough to induce children
and young adult out of high school and university and into the coffee industry.
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These findings provide valuable evidence of the impacts of FT certification for developing
countries. To date, estimates of the impacts of Fair Trade remain limited. Existing studies
primarily rely on cross-sectional analyses based on surveys of producers in a few developing
countries. For example, Bacon (2005) presents the results of a survey of 228 coffee farmers
in Nicaragua, and shows that the farmers who participated in FT and organic networks
received higher average prices and reported feeling less concerned about losing their farm
in the following year. A similar approach is employed by Becchetti and Constantino
(2008) who base their analysis on a survey of 120 farmers in Kenya. Their results show
that FT certification is associated with higher self-reported household consumption, more
diversified production, and lower infant mortality. They find no relationship with child labor
or investments in education. Ruben and Fort (2012) look at the impact of FT certification
on coffee producers in Peru using data from a survey administered to six cooperatives,
three of which were Fair Trade certified. They find no relationship between FT certification
and household income or prices received. However, they do find that FT certification
is associated with higher household expenditures, greater investments in land-attached
infrastructure, better access to credit, and greater investments in organic and similar forms
of specialized farming. In a second paper, Ruben et al. (2009) employ similar data-collection
and empirical techniques to investigate the impact of FT on coffee and banana farmers in in
Costa Rica and Peru. They find that FT certification is associated with slightly higher income
but insignificant difference in expenditures, access to credit, or investment. Arnould et al.
(2009) examine a cross-section of 1,269 coffee farmers from Nicaragua, Peru, and Guatemala.
They find that in all three countries, Fairtrade certification is associated with greater sales,
higher prices, and higher incomes.
One shortcoming of the existing evidence is that it relies on cross-sectional correlations.
In addition, spill-overs and the distributional impacts of FT certification are not examined.
Our study aims to improve upon the existing evidence by examining a panel of individuals
and coffee producers, by estimating differential impacts for coffee workers involved in
different parts of the production process, and by allowing for the existence of spill-over
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benefits to those not working in the coffee industry.
The paper is organized as follows. In the following section, we provide background
information about Fair Trade certification and coffee production in Costa Rica. In section
3.3, we examine effects at the mill-level and test for selection into certification. In section 3.4,
we then examine the impacts of FT certification at the household level, examining effect on
adult incomes and school attendance of children. Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 Background
3.2.1 Fair Trade Certification Generally
Fair Trade has its origins in an initiative started in Netherlands by a church-based NGO
in 1988 in response to low coffee prices. The stated aim of the initiative was to ensure
growers were provided “sufficient wages”. The NGO created a fair trade label for their
products, Max Havelaar, after a fictional Dutch character who opposed the exploitation of
coffee pickers in Dutch colonies. Over the next half decade, Max Havelaar was replicated in
other European countries and North America, and similar organizations, such as TransFair,
emerged. In 1997, the various labeling initiatives formed an umbrella association Fair Trade
Labelling Organization International (FLO) along with three other organizations (including
TransFair). The FT Certification mark was launched in 2002.
The stated goal of Fair Trade is to improve the living conditions of farmers in developing
countries. In practice, this is accomplished through two primary mechanisms: a guaranteed
minimum price for coffee sold and a price premium that is paid. Both are set by Fair Trade
Labelling Organization (FLO). For coffee producers, the minimum guaranteed price (for
conventional Arabica washed coffee) is $1.40 per pound and the premium is $0.20 per
pound.2
The minimum price is meant to cover the average costs of sustainable production, and
acts as a price floor that reduces the risk faced by coffee growers. FT buyers must pay
2The minimum price for organic coffee is $0.30 more and for unwashed coffee is $0.05 less.
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producers at least the minimum price when the world price is lower, and must pay the
higher price when world price is above the FT minimum price. For the much of the past
two decades the price floor has been binding, although not since about 2006.
The guaranteed premium for coffee sold as FT must be set aside and invested in projects
that improve the quality of life for producers and their communities. The specifics of how
the premium is used must to be decided upon in a democratic manner by the producers
themselves. Potential projects that could be funded with the FT premium include the
building of schools and health clinics, offering instruction courses for members of the
community, provision of educational scholarships, investments in community infrastructure,
improvements in water treatment systems, conversion to organic production techniques, etc.
Since 2011, five cents of the premium must be invested towards improving the quality and
productivity of coffee.
For coffee to be sold under the FT mark, all actors in the supply chain, including im-
porters and exporters, must obtain FT certification. On the production side, the certification
is open to small farmer organizations and cooperatives that have a democratic structure,
as well as commercial farms and other companies that employ hired labor (Fair Trade
Foundation, 2012). The certification entails meeting specific standards that are set and
maintained by FLO. An independent certification company FLO-CERT (which split from
FLO International in 2004) is in charge of inspecting and certifying producers (Fair Trade
Foundation, 2012).
For coffee, the FT compliance criteria focus on the social, economic and environmental
development of the community. In terms of social development, the producer organization
must have a democratic structure and transparent administration in place, and must not
discriminate against its members. To satisfy the economic development criteria, organiza-
tions need to be able to effectively export their product and administer the premium in a
transparent and democratic manner. The environmental development criteria are meant to
ensure that the members work towards including environmental practices as an integral
part of farm management, by minimizing or eliminating the use of certain fertilizer and
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pesticides and replacing them with natural, biological methods, as well as adopting practices
that ensure the health and safety of the cooperative members and the entire community
(Fair Trade Foundation, 2012). In the case of commercial plantations that employ a large
number workers, the FT standards entail that hired workers are not children or forced
workers, and are free to bargain collectively. Hired workers must be paid at least minimum
wage in the respective region, and must be given a safe, healthy, and equitable environment
(Fair Trade Foundation, 2012).
To obtain FT certification, producer organizations need to submit an application with
FLO-CERT. If the application is accepted, the organization goes through an initial inspection
process carried out by one of the FLO-CERT representatives in the region. If the minimum
requirements are met, the organization is issued a certificate that is usually valid for a year.
The certificate can be renewed following re-inspection. During the first few years inspection
and certification were free of charge. However, since 2004 producer organizations must pay
application, initial certification, and renewal certification fees.
3.2.2 Coffee Production in Costa Rica
Coffee-cultivation in Costa Rica began to flourish following independence from Spain in
1821. The first coffee plantation were situated in San Jose, the capital of Costa Rica today. The
region surrounding the capital, the Central Valley region, continues to plays an important
role in coffee production. The agro-climatic conditions in the area, and to a large extent in
the country generally, are favorable for coffee cultivation: volcanic soils, high elevation, and
a climate characterized by a wet/dry season, and warm temperatures that stay relatively
constant throughout the year (Instituto del Cafe de Costa Rica, 2012).
Historically, the government encouraged the cultivation of coffee through various policies
such as the delivery of free coffee-plants to growers, land concession to whomever was
interested in cultivating coffee, exemption from paying taxes for coffee, and land titling for
anyone who cultivated coffee for 5 years on wasteland (Instituto del Cafe de Costa Rica,
2012).
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Today, with 1.575 million bags of coffee (weighing 60kg per bag) exported in 2010-2011,
Costa Rica is the 10th largest exporter of Arabica coffee in the world, with Europe being its
primary export market. Approximately, 4% of Costa Rica’s rural workers are in the coffee
industry.
Coffee tends to be cultivated on small plots in family farms. The Costa Rica Coffee
Institute (Instituto de Cafe) estimates that there are approximately 50,631 coffee-producing
families in Costa Rica, of which 92.3% produce less than 75 bags (of 60kg each) per year.
When the ripe coffee cherries are harvested (generally from September until January),
coffee farmers deliver the cherries to a local mill (called beneficio) for further processing. The
beneficio measures the volume of the cherries received and issues a receipt. Here the pulp of
the cherries is removed and the beans are washed through wet-milling and the cherries are
transformed into green coffee.
The mills then sell the coffee received from producers to either roasters or exporters.
Exporting is done through specialized firms, and in many cases through the mill’s own
export arm. Wet-mills usually belong to farmer cooperatives.3 In addition to coffee
processing services, cooperatives also provide a range of services to their members such as
the provision of agricultural supplies, technical assistance, marketing assistance, and credit.
Coffee processing and sales in Costa Rica are heavily regulated by the Instituto del Café
de Costa Rica (ICAFE), a government agency created in 1933 to oversee the coffee-growing
industry and to provide a market that is equitable and fair for all parties involved. Each
transaction between the mill and the exporter or roaster must be registered and approved by
ICAFE (even if the transaction is intra-firm). ICAFE checks all transaction prices to ensure
that each is in line with international coffee prices based on coffee type, denomination and
quality.
Prior to the sale of the coffee by the mill, the farmer receives an advance payment for
the cherries based on the international coffee prices prevailing at the time. The final price
3Cooperative members generally take the cherries to be processed at their cooperative mill, although in
principle they are free to sell their cherries to others mills.
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for the cherries sold is not determined until later in the year when the mill has sold all its
coffee. Historically, the advance payment represents approximately two thirds of the total
payment to the producer received for the harvest.4 Every 15 days, the mill must report to
ICAFE the coffee received from each producer.
Mills must make payment adjustments every 3 months, according to the sales advance-
ments made to the farmer and the new sales made. In November, after all the green coffee
as been sold and the average price for the harvest is determined, mills must make final
payments to the coffee growers, also known as liquidation payments. The final payment to
the producer is the residual payment after approved expenses by the law to the other actors
in the coffee production chain.
The amount of the final sales/export price received by the mill must be distributed as
follows: 3.3% is allocated to the exporter, 14.9% is allocated to the mill (this includes 9%
mill profit and 5.9% for mill expenses), 1.2% is allocated to ICAFE, and 0.5% is allocated to
Fonecafe, which is an insurance fund established to protect farmers in the event of a coffee
crisis. Therefore, the producer receives 80% of the total price.5
3.2.3 Anecdotal Evidence on Selection into Fair Trade Certification
An important question, particularly for our subsequent empirical analysis, is what affects
the decisions of mills to become FT certified. If FT has benefits, why aren’t all mills FT
certified? To better understand the source of variation underlying FT certification, we
undertook interviews with FT-certified cooperatives in August of 2012. The interviews
revealed a number of factors that underlie variation in certification status.
First, mills vary in the effective costs that FT requirements impose on the mill. For
examples, several cooperatives mentioned the potential loss that they may suffer from being
4The mill obtains the funds for the producer advance payments from loans made by state banks, at a fixed
exchange rate. In this way, the mill is exposed only to the fluctuation in the international price of coffee, while
the bank has the exchange rate risk.
5The final liquidation prices for each mill must be published in Costa Rica’s main newspapers in November,
and the mill is obliged to pay the producer the balance of the payment within 8 days.
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prevented from selling certain substances (mostly pesticides) in their stores. (Mills generally
also operate a store where they sell various agricultural supplies to the community.) The
extent to which a mill earns revenue from the sale of agricultural chemicals banned by FT
affects its costs of certification. If this characteristics of mills is historically determined and
varies little over time, it will be captured by mill fixed effects in our empirical analysis.
Second, the perceived benefits of FT certification also vary by mill. One of the primary
benefits of FT sales is the existence of a guaranteed minimum price. The expected future
benefit of this depends on the farmer’s belief about future prices. Those farmers that expect
the future world price for coffee to be above the minimum price perceive lower benefits to
FT certification than farmers that believe future coffee prices may drop below the minimum.
This variation is likely idiosyncratic or correlated with time-invariant characteristics that are
captured by mill fixed effects.
Third, the farmer’s beliefs also play an important role. Farmer’s who a priori believe
in the importance of environmentally sustainable or socially responsible farming practices
will be more willing to undertake the changes in production dictated by FT certification.
These beliefs, although they affect the timing of certification, are likely time-invariant and
captured by mill fixed effects.
The fourth factor mentioned includes access to information regarding the logistics of
becoming certified, and the costs and benefits of certification. Another factor along similar
lines is the managerial ability needed to obtain and maintain certification. These last two
factors potentially vary over time and may be correlated with other factors that also affect
our outcomes of interest. For example, improvements in management or in international
sales connections, may affect FT certification, but may also be associated with increased
exports and prices.
3.3 Evidence from Mill-Level Data
We begin our analysis by examining the relationship between FT certification and outcomes
measured at the mill/cooperative level. By examining what factors are changing for coffee
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producers that become FT certified, we are able to garner some evidence about the nature
of selection into FT certification. If, for example, we find a surge in sales at the time when
the producer becomes FT certified, then this provides evidence that economic conditions
may be driving certification and potentially other outcomes of interest. Similarly, if we see
a surge in exports, then this is evidence of foreign buyers (and access to a large foreign
market) inducing selection into certification. Again, this potentially omitted factor could
have an independent effect on our outcomes of interest.
The analysis combines two types of data. The first is information on coffee prices and
quantities sold by mills and cooperatives. These data are obtained from ICAFE. For each
mill, the ICAFE data contain total production (total coffee received for wet-milling from
coffee growers in that year’s harvest), broken down into the quantity exported and sold on
the domestic market (measured in kilograms), and average prices obtained for the harvest
in export and domestic markets for different types of coffee (conventional, differentiated,
organic etc.).6
The second source of information we use is the FLO certification rosters, which contain
the name and date of certification for all producer-organizations that have been certified
since 2003. From these we extract the names of the coffee producer-organizations located in
Costa Rica, and create an indicator variable for FT certification that equals one in the years
in which the cooperative has the certification and zero otherwise. Since official certification
rosters from FLO are not available to us before 2003, we have supplemented this with
historical and archival research to identify mills that were FT certified between 1999 (the
first year of our sample) and 2003. We match the certification indicator variable available
from FLO with the ICAFE data, using the name of the producer organization as a common
identifier. The matched data produces an unbalanced panel from 1999 until 2010, containing
data for 262 coffee mills.
6The ICAFE data are recorded by harvest years (rather than calendar years), which range from October to
October. In our data, an observation in year t corresponds to the harvest which is from October in year t  1 to
October in year t.
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We begin by estimating the following equation:
yi,t = ai + at + b1 · IFTi,t + # i,t (3.1)
where i indexes a coffee mill and t years (1999–2010). yi,t denotes one of our outcomes of
interest which we describe in more detail below. IFTi,c,t is an indicator variable that equals one
if mill i is FT certified in year t. ai and at denote mill fixed effects and year fixed effects,
respectively. As discussed, mill fixed effects control for time-invariant characteristics which
may be correlated with the timing of FT certification.
We first estimate the relationship between FT certification and coffee sales, both domestic
and foreign. The estimates are informative about the selection of firms into FT certification.
For example, if firms that are prospering choose to become certified, then we expect to
observe a relationship between FT certification and domestic (or total) sales. Similarly, if
firms with increased export opportunities choose to become certified, then we expect to
observe a relationship between FT certification and exports.
Estimates of equation (3.1) are reported in table 3.1. Columns 1, 3, and 5 report estimates
with the natural log of domestic sales, exports and total sales as the dependent variable,
respectively. The even numbered columns report analogous estimates, but controlling for a
lagged dependent variable (LDV). The benefit of the inclusion of a LDV is that it accounts
for the persistence of sales over time, possibly arising due to fixed costs. It is important to
account for dynamics since past production may be associated with current certification
status. A shortcoming of the estimates with a LDV is that because our regressions also
includes mill fixed effects, they suffer from the Nickell bias. We, therefore, report estimates
of equation (3.1) with and without a LDV.
We do not find evidence of statistically significant relationships between FT certification
and increased sales, either domestically or internationally. Columns 7 and 8 examine exports
as a share of total sales. We find no evidence that producers that are FT certified tend to
export more.
Overall, there does not appear to be significant relationships between FT certification
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Table 3.1: The Effect of FT Certification on Producer Organizations: Quantities
ln#domestic#
sales
ln#domestic#
sales ln#exports ln#exports ln#total#sales ln#total#sales
Exports#as#a#
share#of#total#
sales
Exports#as#a#
share#of#total#
sales
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Fair#Trade#Certified,#FTC 0.0441 0.0832 0.146 0.169 0.0489 0.0991 0.0404 0.0465
(0.206) (0.212) (0.143) (0.109) (0.109) (0.0985) (0.0364) (0.0321)
Year#FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Mill#FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Lagged#dependent#variable N Y N Y N Y N Y
Observations 1,182 909 1,187 921 1,220 950 1,220 950
Number#of#clusters/mills 194 235 194 235 194 235 194 235
ROsquared 0.832 0.849 0.923 0.939 0.933 0.951 0.626 0.622
Dependent#variable:
Notes: Coefficients are reported with standard errors clustered at the mill level in parantheses. All regressions include year fixed effects and mill fixed effects. ***,
**,#and#*#indicate#significance#ath#the#1,#5,#and#10#percent#levels.
and the quantity of coffee sold. This is perhaps not surprising since FT certification does
not directly provide a larger market for coffee producers. It only provides a guaranteed
minimum price and a premium for coffee sold as Fair Trade.
The lack of a relationship between FT certification and quantities provides valuable
evidence for the importance of selection into FT certification. If it was the most successful
producers that selected into certification, then we would expect positive and statistically
significant relationships between certification and sales. We do not observe this in the data.
We next turn to the relationship between FT certification and prices. Given that the
stated intention of FT certification is to provide higher prices to certified producers, we do
expect a positive relationship with prices.
Estimates are reported in table 3.2. Again the odd numbered columns do not include a
LDV while the even numbered columns do. Columns 1–8 provide estimates of both average
domestic prices and average export prices. Because of noisy price data, we have a number
of large influential observations. We address this by reporting estimates using winsorized
price data (at the 95th percentile) and using the natural log of prices.
As shown in columns 1-4, we estimate no statistically significant relationship between
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Table 3.2: The Effect of FT Certification on Producer Organizations: Prices
Domestic)
price)
(colon/lb)
Domestic)
price)
(colon/lb)
ln)domestic)
price
ln)domestic)
price
Export)price)
(USD/lb)
Export)price)
(USD/lb) ln)export)price ln)export)price
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Fair)Trade)Certified,)FTC 18.81 9.737 0.0458 H0.00663 0.0386** 0.0399** 0.0508* 0.0497*
(12.66) (14.42) (0.0473) (0.0633) (0.0195) (0.0158) (0.0296) (0.0267)
Year)FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Mill)FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Lagged)dependent)variable N Y N Y N Y N Y
Observations 1,182 909 1,182 909 1,186 919 1,186 919
Number)of)clusters/mills 194 235 194 235 194 235 194 235
RHsquared 0.946 0.949 0.933 0.935 0.935 0.939 0.922 0.929
Notes: Coefficients are reported with standard errors clustered at the mill level in parantheses. All regressions include year fixed effects and mill fixed effects. ***,
**,)and)*)indicate)significance)ath)the)1,)5,)and)10)percent)levels.
Dependent)variable:
domestic prices and FT certification. This is not surprising given that the vast majority of
coffee sold as FT certified is exported and not sold domestically. The estimates reported
in columns 5-8 show that we do find a positive and statistically significant relationship
between FT certification and the export price. According to the estimates certification is
associated with a price that is 4 cents per pound higher or about 5% higher.7
The estimated price impact may seem low given that the price premium alone during
this period was either 10 or 20 cents per pound. However, it is important to keep in mind
that producers in general are unable to sell all of their coffee under the FT label, even
though it qualifies for certification. The supply of FT certified coffee is much greater than
the demand. Therefore, FT certified farmers typically sell a large proportion of their coffee
as conventional.8
As a further test of selection into FT certification, we examine whether there are observ-
able producer characteristics that explain the onset of Fair Trade certification. In particular,
7These estimates are broadly consistent with Ronchi’s (2002) estimated FT price impacts of 3% (exclusive of
the FT premium) for 1998–2002. This was based on fieldwork undertaken with nine COOCAFE cooperatives.
8For a discussion on over-certification and free entry into Fair Trade and its impacts see Janvry et al. (2012).
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we are interested in whether we see a significant increase in production, exports or sales
prices, just prior to the onset of FT certification. If so, then this is evidence that an omitted
factor, like a new contract to supply an overseas buyer, is causing the producer to become
certified and may also be driving our other outcomes of interest, like prices, incomes,
children’s education, etc.
We examine this by estimating a variant of equation (3.1) but where the dependent
variable is an indicator if period t is the first year that producer i is Fair Trade certified.
We consider two sets of observable predictors. The first set is the value of domestic sales,
exports, total sales, domestic prices, and export prices in the previous year. This tests
whether the onset of certification was preceded by abnormally high levels of production,
exports, or sales prices. Similarly, we also consider the growth rate of these variables in the
previous two years (e.g., between periods t  2 and t). This checks whether the onset of
certification is preceded by exceptionally high rates of growth in sales, exports, or prices.
The estimates are reported in table 3.3. Panel A reports the coefficients for the lagged
levels variables and panel B the coefficients for the two-year growth variables. For both,
we are interested in whether we observe a positive relationship between the independent
variables and the onset of certification, since this is evidence of positive selection into
certification. We find no evidence of such an effect. All twelve reported coefficients are
not statistically different from zero, with very small point estimates. In addition, most
coefficients are negative rather than positive. In particular, all three sales variables – domestic,
exports, and total sales – have negative coefficients, suggesting that certifications tend to be
preceded by lower than average sales and lower than average growth in sales.
Overall, the producer-level estimates provide no evidence for positive selection of
producers into FT certification. FT certification is associated with higher export prices and
their magnitudes can be accounted for by the FT premium. In addition, we find that FT
certification is not associated with higher domestic prices, or greater quantities sold. We also
do not find evidence that the onset of certification is preceded by better firm performance
measures by levels or growth of sales, exports, or prices.
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Table 3.3: Determinants of FT Certification
ln#domes)c#
sales ln#exports ln#total#sales
Exports#as#a#
share#of#total#
sales
ln#domes)c#
price ln#export#price
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
One#year#lagged#characteris)c ?0.00056 ?0.00639 ?0.00634 ?0.00557 0.0102 0.0313
(0.00184) (0.00436) (0.00449) (0.00917) (0.0125) (0.0522)
Year#FE,#Mill#FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observa)ons 949 949 971 971 949 948
R?squared 0.141 0.139 0.139 0.138 0.142 0.139
Prior#2?year#growth#(t?2#to#t) ?0.00222 ?0.00081 ?0.00570 0.0176 0.0139 0.0730
(0.00198) (0.00310) (0.00373) (0.0123) (0.0158) (0.0563)
Year#FE,#Mill#FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observa)ons 721 733 753 753 717 720
R?squared 0.160 0.158 0.158 0.158 0.171 0.175
Dependent#variable:#Indicator#for#the#onset#of#FT#cer)ﬁca)on
Notes: Coeﬃcients are reported with standard errors clustered at the mill level in parantheses. All regressions include year ﬁxed eﬀects and
mill ﬁxed eﬀects. The dependent variable is an indicator variable that equals one in the ﬁrst year of Fair Trade cer)ﬁca)on. The independent
variable reported in Panel A is the lag of the characteris)c reported in the column heading. The independent variable in panel B is the growth
of#the#characteris)c#from#period#t?2#to#period#t.#***,#**,#and#*#indicate#signiﬁcance#ath#the#1,#5,#and#10#percent#levels.
Panel#A:#Cer)ﬁca)on#onset#and#lagged#characteris)cs
Panel#B:#Cer)ﬁca)on#onset#and#2?year#growth#of#characteris)cs
Characteris)c#for#independent#variable:
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3.4 FT Certification and Individual-Level Outcomes
3.4.1 Data and Estimating Equations
Our analysis begins uses the combined ICAFE and FLO mill-level data used in the previous
section. Recall that for each mill/cooperative, we know total production, disaggregated
into the quantity exported and the quantity sold domestically, and average prices for both
exports and domestic sales.
To investigate the effect of FT certification on individual-level outcomes, such as employ-
ment, income, education, and community participation, we link the matched ICAFE-FLO
data with household survey data from Encuesta Hogares de Propositos Multiples (EHPM).
EHPM has been carried out in July of each year since 1981. The survey contains information
on individual and household incomes, education, community participation, durable goods
ownership, etc. During our period of analysis, 2003–2009, the survey includes between
43,000–48,000 individuals per year.
We link the two data sources using the canton in which the individual lives and the
canton of the mill/cooperative. The canton is the secondary administrative level (Costa Rica
has 81 cantons). We obtain information of the canton of each mill from the address recorded
by ICAFE. In the few cases where the address of the mill is not available from ICAFE, we
obtained the information by contacting the mill directly.9Because harvested coffee cherries
immediately begin to decompose and ferment, compromising the quality of the coffee,
harvesting and processing occur within a 24 hour period. Given this characteristic of coffee,
the locations of farms and the mills are almost always within the same canton.
Our primary variable of interest is a measure of FT certification intensity in a canton c in
year t, which we denote with FTIct. The measure is the share of exports from in a canton
and year that are from FT certified producers. Our measure relies on the assumption that
the coffee received by a mill comes from coffee growers residing in the same canton as the
mill, an assumption that we feel is valid. The measure we construct is the fraction of total
9We are able to identify the canton for over 90% of mills.
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exports in a canton that are sold by Fair Trade certified producers.10 More precisely, let
Xkct denote total coffee exports in year t by producer-association k located in canton c, and
let IFTkct be an indicator variable that equals one if producer k is FT certified in year t. Our
measure of FT intensity of canton c in year t, FTIct, is given by:
FTIct =Â
k
Xkct · IFTkct
Xkct
. (3.2)
A map showing the Fair Trade certification intensity across cantons in 2003 and 2009
is provided in figure 3.1. Cantons with no coffee production are shown in grey. Of the 81
cantons in Costa Rica, 45 do not produce coffee during our sample period.11 For the 36
cantons with coffee production, the value of FTIct is represented with colors shades between
yellow (low) and red (high).
Variation in FTIct is from two sources: existing or new mills obtaining FT certification
and existing FT certified mills increasing exports relative to non-FT certified mills.
As explained, we combine the FT intensity measure with the EHPM household survey
data, linking households to Fair Trade intensity by their canton. Thus, our first estimating
equation is given by:
yj,i,c,t = ai + ac + at + gcYeart + b1FTIc,t + b2FTIc,t · Ii=coffeej + Xj,tG+ # j,i,c,t (3.3)
where j denotes individuals, i industries (480), c cantons, and t years (2003–2009). The
dependent variable, yj,i,c,t, indicates on of our outcomes of interest, which we describe in
further detail below. FTIc,t is our measure, described above, of the extent of Fair Trade
certification in canton c in year t. Xj,t is a vector of individual-level covariates: education
fixed effects, age, age2, gender, gender ⇥ age, and gender ⇥ age2. The equation includes
canton, time and industry fixed effects. The inclusion of canton fixed effects ac controls for
10It is important to emphasize that our measure is not a measure of the share of exports that are sold as FT
certified. Because we do not know sales of FT certified coffee and non-FT certified coffee by mill, we are unable
to construct this measure. Among the four cooperatives we interviewed in 2012, the share of their total sales in
the previous year that was sold as FT was 80, 53, 40, and 10%.
11As we explain below, all empirical results are robust to restricting the analysis to only include the 36 coffee
producing cantons. In addition, results are robust to only examining the rural areas within these cantons.
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Figure 3.1: Share of coffee producers that are Fair Trade certified (weighted by total exports) in 2003 and 2009.
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time-invariant regional characteristics that affect the outcomes. Time-fixed effects at control
for macroeconomic shocks that are common to all industries and regions (coffee-producing
regions). Industry fixed effects ai control for time-invariant industry characteristics. Finally,
we also include canton-specific linear time trends, gcYeart, which capture differential trends
in cantons over time, which may be correlated with certification.
Although it is likely that many of the benefits of FT spillover to all individuals within a
region, it is also likely that the benefits are greatest for individuals working directly within
the coffee industry. Equation (3.3) allows for this differential effect. The variable Ii=coffeej is
an indicator variable that equals one if individual j’s reported industry is “cultivation of
coffee”. Therefore, the coefficient b2 measures the additional impact FT certification has on
individuals directly involved in the coffee industry. The total effect on these individuals is
given by b1 + b2. Because b1 measures the effect of increasing FT intensity within a region
on individuals not working in the coffee industry, it can be interpreted as the spillover effect
of increasing FT certification within that region.
Even within the coffee industry, it is possible that workers benefit differentially from
FT certification. For example, the farm owners may benefit differently than the unskilled
coffee pickers that are hired seasonally. Therefore, we examine the distribution of benefits
of FT certification with an estimating equation that distinguishes between three different
workers within the coffee industry. These are workers that are defined as being skilled
agricultural workers, unskilled agricultural workers, and all other workers involved in the
coffee industry. In practice, we augment equation ((3.3)) by adding an occupation dimension
and allowing for a differential impact of FT certification to those in the coffee industry
depending on their occupation.
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The augmented estimating equation is:
ln yj,i,o,c,t = ai,o + ac + at + gcYeart
+b1FTIc,t + b2FTIc,t · Ii=coffee,o=unskilledj
+b3FTIc,t · Ii=coffee,o=skilledj + b4FTIc,t · Ii=coffee,o=otherj
+Xj,tG+ # j,i,o,c,t (3.4)
where o indexes a workers occupation (413), and ai,o indicate occupation-industry fixed
effects. Ii=coffee,o=unskilledj is an indicator if j is in coffee cultivation and has an unskilled
occupation, such as “coffee picker” and “agricultural laborers”; Ii=coffee,o=skilledj is an
indicator if j is in coffee cultivation and has a skilled occupation (or is owner), such as
“farmers”, “growers” and “skilled workers” and Ii=coffee,o=otherj is an indicator if individual
j is in coffee cultivation and has an ‘other’ occupation, such as “farm administrator”, “farm
foreman”, “plantation guard”, “coffee taster”, “driver”, etc.
The inclusion of the double interaction terms allow the impact of FT production in a
canton to be different for unskilled, skilled and other occupations in the coffee industry. The
coefficients b2, b3, and b4 measure the differential impact of FT production on the outcomes
of individuals involved in the coffee industry for each of the three categories defined above.
The industry-occupation FEs ai,o capture the baseline coefficients for Ii=coffee,o=unskilledj ,
Ii=coffee,o=skilledj , and I
i=coffee,o=other
j .
An alternative estimation strategy is to explicitly include the double interactions (e.g.,
FTId,t · Ii=coffeej , FTId,t · Io=skilledj ) by estimating the following equation:
ln yj,i,o,c,t = ai,o + ac + at + gcYeart
+b1FTIc,t · Io=unskilledj + b2FTIc,t · Ii=coffee,o=unskilledj
+b3FTIc,t · Io=skilledj + b4FTIc,t · Ii=coffee,o=skilledj
+b5FTIc,t · Io=otherj + b6FTIc,t · Ii=coffee,o=otherj
+Xj,tG+ # j,i,o,c,t (3.5)
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This specification allows both the within-coffee impact and the outside-of-coffee spillover
effect to differ depending on occupation (in this case differentially for unskilled agricultural
workers). The coefficient b3 measures the differential spillover effect of FT production
on unskilled individuals within a district, while b4 measures the additional impact of FT
certification on unskilled individuals in the coffee industry relative to unskilled individuals
in other industries. The impact of FT production on unskilled workers not in the coffee
industry is given by b1, while the impact on unskilled workers in the coffee industry is
given by b1 + b2. As in equation (3.4), in equation (3.5), the double interaction Ii=coffeej ·
Io=unskilledj is absorbed by the industry-occupation fixed effects.
3.4.2 Results
We now turn to our estimation results, beginning first by examining the relationship between
Fair Trade certification and average monthly income.
Incomes
Estimates of equations (3.3)–(3.5) are reported in table 3.4. Column 1 reports estimates of
equation (3.3). The estimates indicate a small positive impact of FT certification within the
canton. In addition, we estimate an additional positive impact for individuals working in
the coffee industry. The combined coefficient for this group is 0.168 compared to 0.068 for
those not in coffee.
The estimates of column 2 show that the average impact for those in coffee masks
significant heterogeneity. The baseline impact to those not the coffee industry remains
similar (0.070) in column 2, although it is no longer statistically significant. In addition,
there is no additional benefit to being an unskilled coffee worker. In fact, the combined
effect of FT certification for these workers is very close to zero: 0.070  0.082 =  0.012. By
contrast, there is an additional benefit to skilled coffee growers. The combined benefit of FT
certification is: 0.070+ 0.329 = 0.399. For all other workers, again the combined benefit of
FT certification is not statistically different from zero: 0.070  0.224 = 0.154.
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Table 3.4: The Effect of FT on Incomes by Industry and Occupation.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Fair-Trade-Intensity,-FTI- 0.063** 0.068 0.161* 0.123
(0.031) (0.050) (0.082) (0.079)
FTI-x-Coffee 0.124 0.110
(0.094) (0.096)
FTI-x-Coffee-x-Skilled 0.334** 0.434** 0.320** 0.421**
(0.144) (0.165) (0.149) (0.169)
FTI-x-Skilled D0.035 0.018
(0.098) (0.121)
FTI-x-Coffee-x-Unskilled D0.059 D0.052 D0.071 D0.065
(0.092) (0.101) (0.092) (0.101)
FTI-x-Unskilled 0.055 0.110
(0.068) (0.092)
FTI-x-Coffee-x-Other D0.205 D0.215 D0.225 D0.235
(0.150) (0.149) (0.153) (0.152)
FTI-x-Other 0.075 0.131*
(0.050) (0.079)
Age,-age2,-gender-&-interactions Y Y Y Y Y Y
Education-controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
81-District-FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
7-Year-FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
10,195-Industry-x-Occupation-FE N Y Y N Y Y
480-Industry-FE Y N N Y N N
DistrictDspecific-time-trends N N N Y Y Y
Observations 112,643 112,643 112,643 112,643 112,643 112,643
Clusters 79 79 79 79 79 79
RDsquared 0.518 0.607 0.607 0.519 0.608 0.608
Sample:-Adults-in-all-districts
Dependent-variable:-ln-individuals'-avg-monthly-income
Notes: The unit of observation is an individual. The dependent variable is the natural log of annual income. Coefficients are
reported with standard errors clustered at the district level. All regressions include education FE, district FE, year FE, and controls
for age, ageDsquared, gender, gender x age, and gender x ageDsquared. Column 1 also controls for industry fixed effects, while
columns-2D5-control-for-industry-x-occupation-fixed-effects.-***,-**,-and-*-indicate-significance-at-the-10,-5-and-1-percent-levels.-
The finding of a large benefit to FT certification for skilled coffee growers, but not for
other workers is confirmed in the estimates of equation (3.5) reported in columns 3-5.
The magnitudes of the estimated effects are sizeable. Consider the impact for skilled
coffee growers. According to the estimates, an increase in FT intensity from 0 to 0.10
(approximately the sample mean) is associated with increase incomes by 40%. This is a very
significant increase.
Overall, the estimates indicate that there are benefits of FT certification, but that these
benefits are unevenly distributed among those within the coffee industry. While the owners
of the coffee farms and their high-skilled workers received higher incomes from certification,
there is no evidence that the other workers, including unskilled coffee pickers benefit in any
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way.
Our findings are not surprising once one considers the structure of FT. Unless the
members of the cooperative (likely the ‘skilled workers’ in our sample) decide to allocate
some of the premium to increasing the wages of coffee pickers and other hired workers
(unskilled and ‘other’ workers in our sample), we should not expect to see any income
effects for this group of workers from increasing FairTrade production. Our findings are
also consistent with descriptive evidence from Valkila and Nygren (2009) indicating that
Guatemalan coffee workers do not appear to benefit from Fair Trade.
In the sample, “other” occupations account for about 7% of all workers in the coffee
industry, “unskilled” occupations account for 50%, and “skilled” occupations account for
43%. Therefore, in terms of overall impacts, it is important to keep in mind that the positive
effects are felt among slightly less than half of coffee workers, while the majority of workers
(57%) felt no impact.
In table 3.5, we test the robustness of our estimates by restricting the sample in a number
of different ways. We first restrict the sample to only include: (i) cantons that produce
coffee (36 in total), and (ii) rural areas of these coffee producing cantons. One could argue
that these provide more comparable samples, since it is possible that individuals living in
urban areas and/or in cantons that are uninvolved in coffee are irrelevant for our analysis.
Estimates of equation (3.4) for these two subsample are reported in columns 3 and 5 (column
1 reproduces the baseline estimates for comparison). We also check the robustness of our
estimates to only examining the incomes of household heads. We do this separately for all
three samples: all cantons, coffee producing cantons, and rural parts of coffee cantons. The
estimates are reported in columns 2, 4, and 6 of table 3.5.
The auxiliary estimates reported in table 3.5 confirm the estimates from table 3.4. The
estimated impacts are very similar. We continue to find a link between FT certification and
higher incomes, but only for skilled coffee growers. The estimated magnitudes are also very
similar to the baseline estimates.
One difference between the specifications is that when we restrict the sample to the rural
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Table 3.5: The Effect of FT on Incomes: Robustness to subsamples
All#individuals
Household#heads#
only All#individuals
Household#heads#
only All#individuals
Household#heads#
only
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Fair#Trade#Intensity,#FTI# 0.123 0.189 0.105 0.170 0.139 0.256
(0.079) (0.141) (0.072) (0.123) (0.104) (0.173)
FTI#x#Coffee#x#Skilled 0.320** 0.347** 0.317** 0.340** 0.351** 0.382**
(0.149) (0.133) (0.151) (0.139) (0.157) (0.145)
FTI#x#Coffee#x#Unskilled I0.071 I0.092 I0.071 I0.104 I0.053 I0.073
(0.092) (0.101) (0.095) (0.102) (0.094) (0.104)
FTI#x#Coffee#x#Other I0.225 I0.193 I0.104 I0.029 I0.090 I0.078
(0.153) (0.152) (0.213) (0.198) (0.233) (0.225)
Age,#age2,#gender#&#interactions Y Y Y Y Y Y
District#FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year#FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Industry#x#Occupation#FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
DistrictIspecific#time#trends Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 112,643 60,315 56,203 29,706 33,261 18,515
Clusters 79 79 36 36 36 36
RIsquared 0.608 0.622 0.629 0.647 0.621 0.634
All#districts Coffee#producing#districts#only
Rural#parts#of#coffee#producing#
districts
Notes: The unit of observation is an individual. Coefficients are reported with standard errors clustered at the district level. All regressions include district FE, industryI
occupation fixed effects, year fixed effects, and controls for age, ageIsquared, gender, gender x age, and gender x ageIsquared. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 10,
5#and#1#percent#levels.
parts of coffee producing cantons, we estimate a larger positive and statistically significant
impact of FT certification to all individuals in the area. This is as expected, since this
subsample is the group that is most likely to be impacted by the spillover benefits from FT
certification, such as subsidies to education, the building of infrastructure, etc.
It is unclear whether the full sample or subsamples are preferred. Although the smaller
samples remove observations that are arguably irrelevant to the impacts of FT certification,
their inclusion does help to more precisely estimate covariates in the regression equation,
like the industry-occupation fixed effects, year fixed effects, and the coefficients on gender
and age (as well as their interactions). Throughout the rest of the paper we report estimates
from the full sample. All of our results are robust to using any of the subsamples reported
in table 3.5.
We also check the robustness of our estimates to the use of different Fairtrade intensity
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measures. The estimates are reported in table 3.6. Column 1 reproduces the baseline
estimate that uses exports to create an export weighted measure of FT intensity. In column
2 reports estimates using production weights. As shown, the estimates are nearly identical.
Next, we use time-invariant export weights. In other words, in equation (3.2), we use Xkc
rather than Xkct, where Xkc is average exports of mill k in canton c between 2003 and 2010.
There is a potential concerned with the variation in FTI arising from the year-to-year change
in exports across mills. This measure, by using a time-invariant measure of exports, is
purged of this variation. As shown in column 4, the estimates remain robust. In column
5, we report similar estimates, but using exports in the initial period, 2003, rather than
average exports as weights. Again, the estimates remain robust. In the last robustness
check we construct an extremely coarse measure of FTI that is completely independent of
any cross-sectional or time series variation in production or exports. We use an indicator
variable that equals one if there is at least one Fair Trade certified mill in the canton in that
year. As shown, the results are robust the use of this coarse measure of Fair Trade intensity.
It is possible that although FT certification does not impact the wages of unskilled and
‘other’ workers in the coffee industry, it does increase the number of workers hired. We
check for this by estimating equations (3.3)–(3.5), but with the dependent variable being
an indicator variable for employment (either full or part time). This tests whether coffee
workers in districts with more FT certified coffee production are more likely to have a job –
i.e., less likely to be unemployed.
The estimates are reported in table 3.7. We find no evidence of that FT certification
increases employment. All of the coefficients of interest are close to zero and statistically
insignificant.
An important caveat about these estimates is that they rely on the assumption that
unemployed workers have a well-defined occupation and industry. In reality this may not
be the case. In the data, for 18.0 percent of the unemployed population either their industry
or occupation is listed as missing. For employed individuals, the same data are missing for
only 0.17 percent of the sample.
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Table 3.6: The Effect of FT on Incomes: Robustness to using alternative FTI measures
Baseline:)export)
weighted
Production)
weighted
Time)invariant)
export)weights
Initial)(2003))
export)weights
Indicator)if)at)least)
on)mill)is)FT)
certified
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Fair)Trade)Intensity,)FTI) 0.123 0.124 0.111** 0.104** 0.074**
(0.079) (0.075) (0.055) (0.040) (0.034)
FTI)x)Coffee)x)Skilled 0.320** 0.317** 0.240* 0.199* 0.178*
(0.149) (0.155) (0.126) (0.115) (0.093)
FTI)x)Coffee)x)Unskilled N0.071 N0.066 N0.062 N0.054 N0.002
(0.092) (0.095) (0.082) (0.079) (0.072)
FTI)x)Coffee)x)Other N0.225 N0.220 N0.149 N0.131 N0.155*
(0.153) (0.158) (0.134) (0.121) (0.092)
Age,)age2,)gender)&)interactions Y Y Y Y Y
District)FE Y Y Y Y Y
Year)FE Y Y Y Y Y
Industry)x)Occupation)FE Y Y Y Y Y
DistrictNspecific)time)trends Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 112,643 112,643 112,643 112,643 112,643
Clusters 79 79 79 79 79
RNsquared 0.608 0.608 0.608 0.608 0.608
Notes: The unit of observation is an individual. Coefficients are reported with standard errors clustered at the district level. All regressions include
district FE, industryNoccupation fixed effects, year fixed effects, and controls for age, ageNsquared, gender, gender x age, and gender x ageNsquared.
***,)**,)and)*)indicate)significance)at)the)10,)5)and)1)percent)levels.
Fair)Trade)Intensity)Measure)Used:
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Table 3.7: The Effect of FT on Employment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Fair-Trade-Intensity,-FTI- 0.003 0.004 0.026** 0.028**
(0.006) (0.008) (0.013) (0.013)
FTI-x-Coffee 0.012 0.011
(0.015) (0.014)
FTI-x-Coffee-x-Skilled B0.002 B0.009 B0.005 B0.013
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
FTI-x-Skilled 0.011 0.037***
(0.007) (0.012)
FTI-x-Coffee-x-Unskilled 0.014 0.005 0.012 0.003
(0.025) (0.026) (0.024) (0.025)
FTI-x-Unskilled 0.013 0.038**
(0.014) (0.017)
FTI-x-Coffee-x-Other B0.059 B0.057 B0.060 B0.058
(0.080) (0.080) (0.079) (0.080)
FTI-x-Other 0.003 0.027**
(0.008) (0.013)
Age,-age2,-gender-&-interactions Y Y Y Y Y Y
Education-controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
81-District-FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
7-Year-FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
10,195-Industry-x-Occupation-FE N Y Y Y Y Y
480-Industry-FE Y N N N N N
DistrictBspecific-time-trends N N N Y Y Y
Observations 123,242 123,242 123,242 123,242 123,242 123,242
Clusters 79 79 79 79 79 79
RBsquared 0.044 0.130 0.130 0.045 0.131 0.131
Sample:-Adults-in-the-labor-force
Dependent-variable:-Employment-indicator-variable
Notes: The unit of observation is an individual. The dependent variable is an indicator variable if an individual is employed (either full or
part time) and in the labor force. Coefficients are reported with standard errors clustered at the district level. All regressions include
education FE, district FE, year FE, and controls for age, ageBsquared, gender, gender x age, and gender x ageBsquared. Column 1 also
controls for industry fixed effects, while columns 2B5 control for industry x occupation fixed effects. ***, **, and * indicate significance
at-the-10,-5-and-1-percent-levels.-
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3.4.3 Children’s Education
We next turn to an investigation of effects of FT certification on education. There are three
main channels through which FT production could impact education. First, by increasing
household incomes, FT certification may increase educational attainment. As we have
seen, FT certification is associated with higher payments to skilled workers in the coffee
industry, as well as a spillover to the incomes of other individuals residing in the same the
canton. Second, Fair Trade certification, by making coffee production a more profitable
endeavor, may increase the opportunity costs of going to school. We expect this to be
particularly relevant for university-aged children. This is an effect has been found in other
developing-country contexts (Atkin, 2012). Third, FT could affect educational attainment
through enhanced provision of public goods in a region. As discussed, in Costa Rica, part of
the Fair Trade premium is directed towards the building of schools, the provision of books,
equipment and other materials, and the provision of scholarships for students to attend
high school, university, and other classes. For example, since COOCAFE’s creation of the
Children of the Field Foundation (Fundación Hijos del Campo) in 1996, they have provided
scholarships to 2,598 students and financial support to 240 schools. COOCAFE estimates
that in all, over 5,800 students have been helped by their foundation.
To examine the impacts of FT certification on educational attainment, we estimate
equation (3.4) among samples of children aged 7 to 12 years old (potential elementary
school students), 13 to 17 (secondary school students) and 18 to 25 (university students).
Rather than using the individuals’ industries and occupations (as we did for the income
regressions), we instead use the industry and occupation of the household head. This is
because industry and occupation are undefined for children that are not employed. Thus,
the estimates report how child school attendance varies with FT certification for households
that are not in coffee production, and for households involved in different occupations
within the coffee industry.
Estimates are reported in table 3.8 for elementary-aged children, secondary-aged children,
and university-aged children respectively. The even numbered columns control for district-
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Table 3.8: FT Certification and School Attendance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Fair-Trade-Intensity,-FTI- 70.003 70.006 0.076** 0.063 70.059** 70.065
(0.005) (0.009) (0.032) (0.078) (0.025) (0.052)
FTI-x-Coffee-x-Skilled 0.022 0.021 70.038 70.047 70.074 70.071
(0.023) (0.024) (0.109) (0.107) (0.057) (0.058)
FTI-x-Coffee-x-Unskilled 0.022 0.023 !0.217*** !0.213** !0.179** !0.168*
(0.027) (0.025) (0.101) (0.100) (0.080) (0.089)
FTI-x-Coffee-x-Other 70.001 70.005 !0.842*** !0.837*** !0.135 !0.106
(0.006) (0.007) (0.165) (0.166) (0.143) (0.135)
Age,-age2,-gender-&-interactions Y Y Y Y Y Y
District-FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year-FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Industry-x-Occupation-FE-(of-hh-head) Y Y Y Y Y Y
District7specific-time-trends N Y N Y N Y
Observations 35,174 35,174 30,653 30,653 41,431 41,431
Clusters 79 79 79 79 79 79
R7squared 0.090 0.095 0.249 0.255 0.305 0.309
Dependent-variable:-Indicator-for-school-enrollment
Notes: The unit of observation is an individual. The dependent variable is an indicator variable if a child attends school. Coefficients are reported with standard
errors clustered at the district level. All regressions include district fixed effects, year fixed effects, fixed effects for the household head's industry x occupation, and
controls-for-age,-age7squared,-gender,-gender-x-age,-and-gender-x-age7squared.-The-even-numbered-columns-also-include-district7specific-time-trends.
Ages-7712 Ages-13717 Ages-18725
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specific time trends while the odd numbered columns do not. An interesting pattern
emerges. First, as reported in columns 1 and 2, FT certification appears to have no impacts
on attendance in elementary schools. This is consistent with the fact that elementary school
attendance rates are very high in Costa Rica. For example, in our sample 99.2% of children
aged 8 report being enrolled in school. Further, there is no indication that Fair Trade
premiums are directed towards elementary schools.
By contrast, we do find evidence of impacts of FT certification on secondary school and
University attendance. The estimates reported in columns 3–6 indicate that for children
aged 13-17 and 18-25, if a household is directly involved in coffee production, then the
impact of FT certification is estimated to be negative and robustly significant for unskilled
workers. The negative estimate is large and significant for high school aged children (13-17)
with parents involved in “other” occupations in the coffee industry.
The reason that FT certification is associated with lower school enrollment among
children of unskilled and “other” coffee workers is not immediately obvious. It it potentially
explained by greater employment opportunities that arise because of FT certification. This
may sound perplexing given that we have seen that unskilled and ‘other’ do not receive
higher wages due to FT certification. However, the increased wages earned by the skilled
workers, may provide a potential future reward that induces children to drop out of
school and enter the coffee industry. Another potential explanation is that FT certification
does provide benefits to workers that are not captured by income, such as safer working
conditions, more stability, better health and dental care, etc. Due to lack of data, our analysis
does not test for these benefits of Fair Trade.
This line of reasoning does raise the question of why we do not observe a decline in
attendance for children of skilled coffee workers, particularly since they are the ones that
actually receive higher wages. Certainly, the expected increase to incomes must be greatest
for this group. However, the explanation may lie in a counteracting effect of higher incomes.
As has been shown in other developing-country contexts low incomes prevent parents from
being able to send children to school. Edmonds et al. (2010) show this when examining
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Table 3.9: FT Certification, Education, and Employment: Ages 13-17
AttendSchool Inactive Inlaborforce Employed Unemployed
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
FairTradeIntensity,FTI 0.063 Ͳ0.137* 0.147** 0.146** 0.001
(0.078) (0.074) (0.070) (0.058) (0.015)
FTIxCoffeexUnskilled Ͳ0.047 0.043 Ͳ0.037 Ͳ0.027 Ͳ0.010
(0.107) (0.104) (0.100) (0.094) (0.018)
FTIxCoffeexSkilled Ͳ0.213** Ͳ0.012 0.003 0.003 Ͳ0.000
(0.100) (0.076) (0.071) (0.068) (0.033)
FTIxCoffeexOther Ͳ0.837*** Ͳ0.466*** 0.455*** 0.469*** Ͳ0.013
(0.166) (0.059) (0.052) (0.055) (0.026)
Age,age2,gender&interactions Y Y Y Y Y
36DistrictFE Y Y Y Y Y
7YearFE Y Y Y Y Y
7,171IndustryxOccupationFE Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 30,653 30,653 30,653 30,653 30,653
RͲsquared 0.255 0.261 0.256 0.237 0.138
Sample:Individuals13Ͳ17yearsold
Notes : The unit of observation is an individual. Coefficients are reported with standard errors clustered at the district level. All regressions
include district FE, industryͲoccupation fixed effects, year fixed effects, districtͲspecific time trends, and controls for age, ageͲsquared, gender,
genderxage,andgenderxageͲsquared.***,**,and*indicatesignificanceatthe10,5and1percentlevels.
the impacts of India’s 1991 tariff reforms. Therefore, FT-induced increase in income may
work as a counteracting force increasing school enrollment for this group. In other words,
for children of parents in the coffee industry, higher incomes from FT induce children to
drop out of school. But for children of parents that receive higher incomes from FT, this
reduction is counteracted by an increase in enrollment due to higher incomes.
In an attempt to better understand the reason for the education results, we also examine
the relationship between FT certification and the following alternative activities: being
inactive, participating in the labor force, being employed, and being unemployed. Estimates
are reported in tables 3.9 and 3.10 for children aged 13–17 and 18–25. Column 1 of the
tables reproduce the education estimates of specification (3.3). Columns 2–4 of the tables
report estimates where the dependent variable is an indicator for the individual being in
the labor force (employed or unemployed), an indicator for being inactive, an indicator for
employment, and an indicator for unemployment.
Consider first the estimates for 13–17 year old teenagers reported in table 3.9. The
estimates show that the decline in school attendance for children of “other” coffee workers
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Table 3.10: FT Certification, Education, and Employment: Ages 18-25
Attend&School Inactive In&labor&force Employed Unemployed
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Fair&Trade&Intensity,&FTI& C0.065 C0.038 0.042 0.112** C0.070***
(0.052) (0.058) (0.046) (0.050) (0.019)
FTI&x&Coffee&x&Unskilled C0.071 C0.064 0.104 0.025 0.079***
(0.058) (0.091) (0.092) (0.091) (0.029)
FTI&x&Coffee&x&Skilled C0.168* 0.027 C0.016 C0.121 0.104
(0.089) (0.114) (0.115) (0.101) (0.088)
FTI&x&Coffee&x&Other C0.106 0.258** C0.258*** C0.252*** C0.006
(0.135) (0.106) (0.092) (0.092) (0.023)
Age,&age2,&gender& &interactions Y Y Y Y Y
36&District&FE Y Y Y Y Y
7&Year&FE Y Y Y Y Y
7,171&Industry&x&Occupation&FE Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 41,431 41,431 41,431 41,431 41,431
RCsquared 0.309 0.327 0.303 0.299 0.135
Sample:&Individuals&18C25&years&old
Notes: The unit of observation is an individual. Coefficients are reported with standard errors clustered at the district level. All regressions include
district FE, industryCoccupation fixed effects, year fixed effects, districtCspecific time trends, and controls for age, ageCsquared, gender, gender x age,
and&gender&x&ageCsquared.&***,&**,&and&*&indicate&significance&at&the&10,&5&and&1&percent&levels.
coincides with a decrease in children that are inactive and an increase of children in the
labor force that are employed. There is no association with unemployment. This suggest
that FT is associated with children being drawn from school and from an inactive status
and moving into employment. The estimates also show that for children of parents not in
coffee, FT coffee production in a canton is associated with a movement of children from
inactivity into employment.
Next, consider the estimates for 18–25 year old youths reported in table 3.9. For children
of parents that are “other workers” in coffee, we see that FT certification is associated with
an increase in inactivity and a decline in employment. In other words, FT is associated with
children dropping out of employment (or being force to drop out) and moving into inactivity.
We also see some evidence of that FT is associated with an increase in unemployment for
the children of unskilled coffee workers and a decrease in unemployment (and increase in
employment) for children of those not in coffee.
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3.5 Conclusion
Our analysis has provided evidence, taken from coffee production in Costa Rica, that Fair
Trade certification can have impacts in developing countries. However, our analysis also
showed that the benefits of Fair Trade may not be distributed to the poorest workers in the
industry. Examining individual-level survey data, we found that Fair Trade certification
is associated with increased incomes of a small group of skilled coffee growers and farm
owners. For other workers in the coffee industry we find no evidence that FT certification
increases income.
We also examined impacts on the education of children. We found that FT certification
is associated with increased school attendance in the region. This is most likely due to
the FT premium that is set aside for educational support and scholarships by FT certified
producers. We also found evidence that FT certification is associated with lower school
attendance among some children of coffee workers. This is likely due to increased economic
opportunities that arise due to FT certification, drawing children out of school and into the
workforce.
To gain further evidence on selection into certification and causal mechanisms, we
moved to an examination of finer data at the producer level. We found that FT certification
is associated with higher export prices (approx. 5 cents per pound), but that there is no
evidence that certification is associated with more sales (either domestic or for export) or
with higher domestic prices. This is consistent with expectations since FT certification
increases the price of coffee sold as Fair Trade – primarily exports – while certification does
not itself guarantee or attempt to directly generate increased sales. Further the fact that we
do not see large increases in sales associated with FT certification provides some confidence
that selection of ‘better’ coffee producers in ‘better’ regions is not playing a large part. We
can therefore be more confident that the income and education estimates are close to causal
estimates.
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